tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-86926119739816827722024-03-12T21:11:54.266-07:00Institute for the Study of War Syria UpdatesInstitute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comBlogger145125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-32247804201192556632015-08-25T07:56:00.000-07:002015-08-25T07:56:32.682-07:00<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif; font-size: large;">ISW has a new combined Research blog that can be found <a href="http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/" target="_blank">here</a>. You should be redirected automatically.</span></div>
Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-87344306628445858892015-08-19T13:48:00.000-07:002015-08-19T13:49:40.298-07:00Syrian Rebel Forces Pressure Regime Heartland<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<i>by: <a href="http://understandingwar.org/press-media/staff-bios/christopher-kozak" target="_blank">Christopher Kozak</a></i></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Pro-regime populations in Tartus City, Latakia City, and the Shia-majority Sayyida Zeinab suburb of Damascus held rare street protests over the past eleven days which likely reflect a stream of latent dissatisfaction with the recent battlefield performance of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The demonstrations primarily called upon regime forces to relieve several besieged pro-regime enclaves scattered throughout northern Syria, and any major split between Syrian Alawites and the Syrian regime remains highly unlikely. Nonetheless, the Alawite population of the Syrian Coast faces mounting security concerns which likely drove this wave of public dissent. In recent weeks, heavy clashes between regime and rebel forces moved onto the strategic al-Ghab Plain of northwestern Hama Province, presenting a threat both to the borders of Latakia Province in general and the regional command-and-control node for both the Syrian Arab Army and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps located in the town of Joureen. Several rebel factions participating in the fighting on the al-Ghab Plain, including Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra and hardline Islamist group Ahrar al-Sham, have repeatedly messaged their intent to strike deep into the Alawite heartland and overrun the Assad family hometown of Qardaha. These threats likely resonate with Syrian Alawites due to previous failed rebel offensives into Latakia Province in 2013 and 2014 which reportedly included mass killings and deportations of minority populations. In this context, the inability of pro-regime forces to achieve decisive victory in the al-Ghab Plain or prevent recent volleys of rebel shelling targeting Latakia City, Qardaha, and other prominent towns have likely further eroded public confidence in the long-term protection provided by the Syrian regime. </span></div>
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Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-87958030245688541932015-07-25T11:51:00.000-07:002015-07-28T09:41:01.461-07:00Turkey Expands Campaign against ISIS and the PKK<div style="text-align: center;">
<i>by: <a href="http://understandingwar.org/press-media/staff-bios/christopher-kozak" target="_blank">Christopher Kozak</a></i></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">The conclusion of an agreement between Turkey and the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition to open Turkish airbases for coalition aircraft conducting sorties against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) marks a major shift in Turkish policy which will provide immediate boost to U.S. efforts to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIS. At the same time, Turkey began launching airstrikes and internal crackdowns targeting members of both ISIS and the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the wake of several days of violence which included an ISIS-linked SVEST attack inside Turkey and several PKK-linked assassinations of Turkish police officers. Turkey’s decision to escalate against both militant groups suggests that Turkey intends to leverage the coalition’s calls for further action against ISIS in order to assert its own strategic interest in limiting the expansion of armed Kurdish groups along the Turkish border. The government of Turkish President Recep Erdogan may also seek to utilize these security threats to increase its own political standing amidst ongoing negotiations to form a coalition government and a potential call for early elections. Over the near-term Turkey will face an expanded domestic threat from both ISIS and PKK militancy in the form of persistent violence against the Turkish state. Nonetheless, a sustained Turkish effort against ISIS’s networks in Turkey and northern Syria combined with the efforts of local anti-ISIS Syrian opposition forces has the potential to significantly disrupt the foreign fighter flows which provide ISIS with a key source of reinforcements, suicide bombers, and legitimacy as a global caliphate.</span></i></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Turkey significantly increased its participation in the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition in a marked shift from its previous hesitancy to directly engage the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a </span><a href="http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-212_-24-july-2015_-press-statement-concerning-turkey_us-understanding-on-countering-deash.en.mfa" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">statement</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> on July 24 confirming that Turkey and the U.S. had agreed to “further deepen their ongoing cooperation in the fight against ISIS” following a telephone </span><a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/22/readout-president%E2%80%99s-call-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-turkey" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">conversation</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> between U.S. President Barack Obama and Turkish President Recep Erdogan on July 22. Although the exact details of the deal remain unknown, President Erdogan </span><a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-president-confirms-us-use-of-incirlik-base.aspx?pageID=238&nID=85884&NewsCatID=338" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">confirmed</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> that the Turkish government granted the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition </span><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/24/world/europe/turkey-isis-us-airstrikes-syria.html" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">access</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> to the strategic Incirlik and Diyarbakir Airbases in southern Turkey “within a certain framework” in a move long sought by the U.S. to stage operations near Syria. The opening of these bases would sharply reduce the distance that coalition aircraft must transit to strike ISIS targets in Syria, allowing for an increased rate of daily combat sorties. The Turkish government also reportedly </span><a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/partial-no-fly-zone-included-in-us-turkey-consensus-turkish-sources.aspx?pageID=238&nID=85850&NewsCatID=510" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">authorized</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> the U.S.-led coalition to utilize airbases in the southern cities of Batman and Malatya for emergency situations.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Unverified Turkish sources </span><a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/partial-no-fly-zone-included-in-us-turkey-consensus-turkish-sources.aspx?pageID=238&nID=85850&NewsCatID=510" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">indicated</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> that the deal also included provisions for an “</span><a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-us-to-create-isil-free-zone-inside-syria.aspx?pageID=238&nid=85906&NewsCatID=510" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">ISIS-free</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">” zone extending forty to fifty kilometers into ISIS-held regions of Aleppo Province in northern Syria in order to attack ISIS in greater depth within Syrian territory. Turkish and U.S.-led coalition aircraft would perform “attacking or exploration” missions over the zone “as needed” in order to prevent advances by ISIS or Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). The exact parameters of this claimed zone have not yet been clearly defined in the public record. Although some Turkish sources referred to the region as a no-fly zone and claimed that Syrian regime aircraft entering the zone would also be targeted, U.S. officials including U.S. Special Envoy to the Anti-ISIS Coalition Gen. John Allen (ret.) </span><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/24/world/europe/turkey-isis-us-airstrikes-syria.html" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">denied</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> that the implementation of a no-fly zone had been “part of the discussion.”</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs also </span><a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-fighter-jets-to-join-anti-isil-coalition-airstrikes.aspx?pageID=238&nID=85910&NewsCatID=510" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">announced</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> that Turkish warplanes will directly participate in the international anti-ISIS coalition air campaign for the first time. Turkey launched the opening salvo of this expanded role in the morning of July 24 as three Turkish F-16 fighter jets </span><a href="http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/_Article/pg_Article.aspx?Id=c7fed72b-46b3-4b5c-bae4-40bab8c7466b" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">departed</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> from Diyarbakir Airbase in south-central Turkey and </span><a href="http://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/tskdan-iside-hava-operasyonu%2cSumqTSTlsE6HYjQ6ME-XNw" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">conducted</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> three airstrikes against ISIS targets in the Syrian border town of </span><a href="http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=36.660983&lon=37.235069&z=13&m=b&show=/24079926/Hawar-Killis" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Hawar Kilis</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> north of Aleppo City. Turkish media sources reported that the strikes comprised part of a newly-declared Turkish military operation named “</span><a href="https://twitter.com/CNNTURK_ENG/status/624406295991459840" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Martyr Yalcin</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">” after a Turkish non-commissioned officer killed during a </span><a href="http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/23/middleeast/turkey-syria-isis-violence/" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">gunfight</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> with ISIS militants along the Syrian border on July 23. A second round of Turkish airstrikes on the night of July 24-25 also </span><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/26/world/middleeast/turkey-attacks-kurdish-militant-camps-in-northern-iraq.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=second-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">targeted</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> positions of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) militant group in northern Iraq for the first time since 2011, effectively ending a two-year ceasefire agreement between the PKK and the Turkish government. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stated that the airstrikes were not an isolated incident but rather </span><a href="https://twitter.com/CNNTURK_ENG/status/624517731405168640" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">part</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> of an ongoing “process” to </span><a href="https://twitter.com/CNNTURK_ENG/status/624518158062383104" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">address</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> threats along the Turkish border. Nonetheless, one Turkish government official speaking to <em style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Reuters</em> later </span><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/24/us-mideast-crisis-turkey-islamicstate-idUSKCN0PY0AU20150724" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">noted</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> that “we can't say this is the beginning of a military campaign, but certainly the policy will be more involved, active and more engaged.” These statements imply that Turkey intends to sustain its activities against ISIS and the PKK over a long-term campaign.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">The outlines of this agreement between the U.S. and Turkey appear to have been laid during a </span><a href="http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2015/Jul-07/305552-top-us-envoy-in-turkey-after-syria-intervention-speculation.ashx" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">visit</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> to Turkey by Gen. John Allen (ret.) and U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Christine Wormuth on July 7-8. Unconfirmed </span><a href="http://aranews.net/2015/07/turkey-opens-incirlik-air-base-for-u-s-led-coalitions-warplanes/" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">reports</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> at the time suggested that the talks had resulted in preliminary approval for the coalition’s use of Incirlik Airbase after Turkey received assurances that the U.S. would consider Turkish proposals for a buffer zone in northern Syria and block any attempt by Syrian Kurdish forces to move into areas along the Turkish border west of the Euphrates River. These accounts suggested that Turkey had offered a major concession by dropping its long-standing insistence that the international coalition expand its air campaign against ISIS to include airstrikes against the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. This rebalancing suggests that recent developments may have led the Turkish government to prioritize the internal security threats posed by ISIS and the PKK over Turkey’s regional concerns regarding Iranian expansionism and the enduring presence of the Syrian regime.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">The successful conclusion of these negotiations following months of talks likely came as a product of the intensifying security concerns facing the Turkish government. Turkey had previously avoided overt confrontation with ISIS and other militant groups transiting through its territory in order to apply indirect pressure to both the Syrian regime and the Syrian Kurdish YPG, which the Turkish government views as an offshoot of the PKK. This stance also enabled Turkey to limit the potential for violent terrorist attacks within its borders by providing an incentive for ISIS and other extremist groups to avoid jeopardizing their supply routes through Turkey by disrupting the status quo. Although the existence of these transit pathways represented an implicit threat to Turkey, the </span><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/15/us-mideast-crisis-kurds-idUSKBN0OV1OI20150615" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">seizure</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> of the border town of Tel Abyad in northern Syria from ISIS on June 15 by Kurdish YPG forces appears to have been the primary trigger which forced Turkey to reevaluate its security policies. The prospect of further gains along the Syrian-Turkish border by PKK-linked Kurdish forces directly supported by the U.S.-led coalition likely generated the impetus for Turkey to further engage with the anti-ISIS coalition in order to ensure that the coalition campaign would evolve in line with Turkey’s own strategic interests.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">The Turkish government soon moved to link its concerns regarding the Kurds to the security threat posed by ISIS in a likely attempt to attract buy-in from the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition for the imposition of limits on further Kurdish expansion. President Erdogan </span><a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ankara-on-alert-over-developments-in-northern-syria.aspx?pageID=238&nid=84174&NewsCatID=510" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">called</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> security meetings with senior Turkish government and military officials on June 17-18 which </span><a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ankara-warns-pyd-over-demographic-change-in-northern-s" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">established</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> “red lines” for further Kurdish expansion in Syria. The Turkish National Security Council held additional meetings to address the threat posed by ISIS, and on June 29 an advisor to Prime Minister Davutoglu </span><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/29/us-mideast-crisis-syria-turkey-idUSKCN0P90RG2" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">stated</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> that the meetings would likely result in a change to the Turkish military’s rules of engagement that would authorize attacks against ISIS fighters inside Syria near the Turkish border. Over subsequent weeks Turkey reinforced its border with </span><a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-military-sends-more-weapons-to-tense-syrian-border-amid-heated-political-debate.aspx?pageID=238&nid=84787&NewsCatID=338" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">large</span></a><a href="http://syriadirect.org/news/turkish-tanks-at-syrian-border/" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">numbers</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> of soldiers, armored vehicles, and artillery units, placing a particular concentration in Kilis and Gaziantep Provinces opposite ISIS-held areas of Aleppo Province in Syria. By July 22, Turkish media </span><a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-to-fly-surveillance-balloons-build-new-fence-and-moat-for-border-security.aspx?pageID=238&nid=85810&NewsCatID=510" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">reported</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> that half of Turkey’s border security personnel and armored cars as well as 90% of Turkey’s drones had been deployed to the Syrian border. Meanwhile, Turkey also began a </span><a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-police-detain-more-isil-recruits.aspx?pageID=238&nid=85350&NewsCatID=509" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">crackdown</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> against suspected ISIS members or sympathizers inside Turkey. President Erdogan </span><a href="https://maktoob.news.yahoo.com/%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%87%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-031812059.html" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">noted</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> on July 10 that nearly 1,300 foreigners had been arrested and deported on suspicion of involvement with ISIS.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">These security concerns dramatically escalated on July 20 after a </span><a href="http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2015/Jul-20/307479-initial-findings-show-isis-carried-out-bomb-attack-turkey-pm.ashx" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">suspected</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> ISIS member conducted a spectacular SVEST </span><a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/blast-kills-at-least-28-wounds-nearly-100-in-turkish-town-near-syrian-border-1.3159663?cmp=rss" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">attack</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> against a group of pro-Kurdish student activists in the southern Turkish town of Suruc on July 20, killing at least thirty-one individuals and wounding over one hundred others. Kurdish activists linked the bombing to a similar double IED </span><a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33035450" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">attack</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> against a Kurdish political rally in Diyarbakir on June 6 which killed four individuals and wounded at least 400 others, raising the prospect of an incipient ISIS campaign to target Kurds inside of Turkey. This message was reinforced with the </span><a href="https://ia801504.us.archive.org/0/items/KonstantiniyyeDergisi2.Say/Konstantiniyye%20Dergisi%202.Say%C4%B1.pdf" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">release</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> of the second issue of ISIS’s Turkish-language <em style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Constantinople</em> magazine on July 21 which contained a </span><a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/isils-magazine-slams-erdogan-turkey-for-first-time.aspx?pageID=238&nID=85754&NewsCatID=338" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">warning</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> that Kurds fighting ISIS in Iraq and Syria “may fight in Turkey in a similar way in the not too distant future.” In response, Kurdish militants engaged in their own campaign of targeted violence against alleged ISIS “collaborators”, triggering a major amplification of violence within Turkey. The PKK claimed responsibility for the </span><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/22/mideast-crisis-turkey-idUSL5N1021M620150722" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">execution</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> of two Turkish police officers with a claimed association to ISIS in the border town of Ceylanpinar on July 22. Suspected PKK members also </span><a href="http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2015/07/150722_turkey_hatay_akp_explosion" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">killed</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> another Turkish police officer in an ambush in Diyarbakir, while members of the PKK youth wing </span><a href="http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2015/Jul-23/307938-militant-kurds-kill-isis-fighter-in-istanbul-reports.ashx" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">executed</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> an alleged ISIS member in Istanbul. Turkish security forces also </span><a href="http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2015/07/150722_turkey_hatay_akp_explosion" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">discovered</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> IEDs in front of two offices of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) of President Erdogan in the Turkish capital of Ankara and the southwestern Turkish province of Hatay. Kurds and Turkish opposition parties held large </span><a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/7/22/protesters-clash-with-turkish-police-after-suicide-bombing.html" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">street</span></a><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/22/mideast-crisis-turkey-idUSL5N1021M620150722" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">protests</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> in Istanbul, Ankara, and several other Turkish cities which in some cases devolved into violence.<span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> </span></span></span></div>
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<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-UxClU19TT_0/VbewTACEMLI/AAAAAAAADvo/Ic1EsaUBMJg/s1600/Aleppo%2BProvince%2BMap_5%2B%25281%2529.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-UxClU19TT_0/VbewTACEMLI/AAAAAAAADvo/Ic1EsaUBMJg/s1600/Aleppo%2BProvince%2BMap_5%2B%25281%2529.png" /></a></div>
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">The threat posed by this spiral of violence likely played a role in expediting the final agreement between the U.S. and Turkey. On June 24, simultaneous with the implementation of the agreement, Turkish security forces </span><a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/one-killed-over-290-detained-as-turkish-police-raid-suspected-isil-pkk-militants.aspx?pageID=238&nID=85854&NewsCatID=509" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">launched</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> a wave of arrests targeting suspected ISIS, Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and leftist Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C) members throughout thirteen Turkish provinces which detained at least 297 individuals. Local media reported that the raids </span><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/24/us-mideast-crisis-turkey-islamicstate-idUSKCN0PY0AU20150724?irpc=932" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">involved</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> thousands of police officers and Special Forces soldiers supported by helicopters. CNN Turk reported that anti-terror police </span><a href="https://twitter.com/CNNTURK_ENG/status/624429098962681856" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">raided</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> over 140 locations in the major city of Istanbul alone, </span><a href="https://twitter.com/CNNTURK_ENG/status/624476406727184384" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">detaining</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> ninety individuals including thirty foreigners. The office of Prime Minister Davutoglu later </span><a href="http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/_Article/pg_Article.aspx?Id=4c6d26f2-4994-4321-afb9-a497aa455a2b" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">released</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> a statement pledging to fight all transnational “terrorist” groups “without distinction.” A senior Turkish official </span><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/24/us-mideast-crisis-turkey-islamicstate-idUSKCN0PY0AU20150724?irpc=932" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">characterized</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> the airstrikes in Syria and the domestic raids as dual “preventative measures” conducted in line with a policy decision to “move to active defense from passive defense” that had been </span><a href="https://twitter.com/CNNTURK_ENG/status/624414802417463296" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">formalized</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> during an emergency “</span><a href="http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/_Article/pg_Article.aspx?Id=36c57ef7-bf5a-4c3b-9677-6da06b02798e" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Special Security Meeting</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">” on July 23. This confluence of events may have provided the final stimulus for Turkey to adopt a more aggressive stance against ISIS in exchange for the acquiescence of the U.S.-led coalition towards Turkish military action against the PKK.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">The timing of the start of combat operations against both ISIS and the PKK may also have been driven by domestic Turkish political concerns. President Erdogan and his ruling AKP Party have come under heavy </span><a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/chp-blames-flawed-foreign-policy-of-govt-for-leading-to-terrorist-threats.aspx?pageID=238&nID=85733&NewsCatID=338" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">criticism </span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">from domestic opponents for their foreign policy towards Syria, which included a permissive attitude towards ISIS, JN, and other extremist groups fighting the Assad regime in Syria. These mounting criticisms came to a head during the Turkish general elections on June 7 in which the AKP </span><a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/07/turkey-election-preliminary-results-erdogan-akp-party" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">lost</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> their overall majority in the Turkish Parliament amidst historic gains for the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP). This development raised the potential for a shift in Turkish policy towards the Syrian Civil War as Turkish opposition parties pressed the AKP to reduce its hostility towards Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, limit its support to Syrian opposition factions, and establish positive relations with Syrian Kurds. Nonetheless, ongoing </span><a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/chp-leader-sees-prospect-of-early-election-higher-than-a-coalition-govt.aspx?pageID=238&nID=85841&NewsCatID=338" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">negotiations</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> between the AKP and rival Turkish political parties to form a coalition government do not appear to be gaining traction and a call for early elections in Turkey appears likely. Expanded Turkish participation in the anti-ISIS coalition may thus serve a political goal for President Erdogan and the AKP by undercutting criticism of government policy towards ISIS and rallying the Turkish populace in the face of domestic security threats. The increase in violence attributed to the PKK and other Kurdish militant groups will also likely erode the position of the HDP to the benefit of the AKP. If early elections are called, these effects could improve the AKP’s vote share sufficiently to allow the AKP to regain its outright parliamentary majority and advance its Syria policy unhindered.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">The expansion of Turkey’s role in the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition will almost certainly generate an immediate reaction in the form of retaliatory attacks from ISIS or ISIS sympathizers operating inside of Turkey. Thousands of foreign fighters have </span><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/10/world/europe/despite-crackdown-path-to-join-isis-often-winds-through-porous-turkish-border.html" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">utilized</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> Turkey and its porous border with Syria as a pathway to join with ISIS forces in Syria and Iraq, including an </span><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/world/europe/turkey-is-a-steady-source-of-isis-recruits.html" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">estimated</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> 1,000 Turkish citizens. The members of these covert ISIS networks represent a key threat to Turkey’s internal security, and ISIS will likely seek to activate these cells in order to punish the Turkish government. ISIS fighters and supporters began </span><a href="http://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Western-Jihadists/is-fighters-and-supporters-threaten-turkey-amid-new-attacks-on-is-forces.html" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">circulating</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> violent rhetoric against the Turkey within hours of the Turkish airstrikes on July 24. At the same time, Turkey also faces expanded internal turmoil in its southeastern Kurdish-majority provinces due to the resumption of hostilities with the PKK and other Kurdish militant groups. These two simultaneous threat streams will likely interact to prompt further attacks inside of Turkey in coming weeks targeting the Turkish government, Turkish military forces, or vital Turkish interests such as the tourism industry.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Turkish intervention in Aleppo Province could also prompt a response from Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and JN-aligned Salafi-jihadist groups operating along the Turkish border. Unverified Turkish sources </span><a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/partial-no-fly-zone-included-in-us-turkey-consensus-turkish-sources.aspx?pageID=238&nID=85850&NewsCatID=510" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">identified</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> both ISIS and JN as targets for Turkish and U.S.-led coalition airstrikes. JN later </span><a href="https://twitter.com/JnHalab5/status/624669451745669124" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">claimed</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> on July 24 that aircraft from the “Arab-Crusader alliance” had conducted airstrikes against JN positions in the town of </span><a href="http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=36.633524&lon=37.231078&z=15&m=b&show=/6689793/Baraghitah" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Baraghitah</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> in northern Aleppo Province. Baraghitah is located directly adjacent to the announced location of Turkish airstrikes in the town of Hawar Kilis, suggesting that Turkish aircraft may have also conducted strikes against JN. Although JN remains unlikely to directly escalate against Turkey due to its own reliance on supply lines running through the Turkish border, sustained targeting of JN could ultimately drive the group to conduct attacks against Turkey or Turkish-sponsored rebel groups operating in Aleppo and Idlib Provinces.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Meanwhile, Turkish military action against ISIS forces in northern Syria could produce significant ramifications for the current balance of power between ISIS, Syrian rebels, and the Syrian regime in Aleppo Province. A sustained campaign of Turkish airstrikes and artillery shelling designed to force ISIS away from the Turkish border would likely open exploitable opportunities for rebel forces to advance against ISIS in the northern countryside of Aleppo City, reversing ISIS’s recent </span><a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/isil-seizes-territory-syria-rebels-aleppo-150602154413816.html" style="background: transparent; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">gains</span></a><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"> in the region and reducing the threat posed to the key rebel supply line moving from Turkey through the Syrian border town of Azaz. Over the long-term, ISIS’s position could be sufficiently weakened to enable advances by both rebel and regime forces east of Aleppo City, which could ultimately threaten ISIS’s control over the key urban centers of al-Bab, Manbij, and Jarabulus. Turkey will also likely seek to leverage these rebel advances as a means to block further Syrian Kurdish advances in Aleppo Province along the Turkish border. On a wider scale, the campaign of mass arrests and invigorated border security efforts undertaken by the Turkish government could result in a significant disruption of the foreign fighter flows which provide ISIS with a key source of reinforcements, suicide bombers, and legitimacy as a global caliphate. The intersection of these effects with potential losses of terrain in Aleppo Province would likely inflict significant damage to ISIS’s operations within both Iraq and Syria. ISIS may thus attempt to reduce its overall risk profile by setting conditions over the near-term to secure additional border access, particularly in the opposition-held province of Idlib in northwestern Syria which has seen a series of recent ISIS-attributed assassinations and bombings.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background: transparent; border: 0px; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">The increase in Turkish support to the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition through expanded border security, airstrikes, and airbase access will deliver an immediate boost to U.S. efforts to degrade and defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Nonetheless, Turkey’s decision to escalate against both ISIS and the PKK will also produce a number of challenges for the U.S. and its coalition allies in the near-term. The high likelihood of retaliatory attacks in Turkey directed by both Salafi-jihadist and Kurdish militants suggests that the U.S. will witness persistent violence in a major NATO ally. U.S.-led coalition personnel stationed at newly-opened airbases in Turkey may come under particular risk of attack due to the heavy presence of ISIS networks in the country. The U.S.-led coalition could also face pushback or reduced cooperation from the Syrian Kurdish forces that have formed the core U.S. ground partner in Syria as a result of renewed hostilities between the Turkish government and the PKK. Over the long-term, however, the expansion of the Turkish role against ISIS will likely mark a major positive development for the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition and its efforts to dismantle the Islamic State.</span></span></div>
Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-42489372402675438622015-07-09T09:13:00.000-07:002015-07-09T09:55:44.678-07:00Significant Offensives in Syria: June 6 - July 9, 2015<div style="text-align: center;">
<i>by: Christopher Kozak and Genevieve Casagrande</i></div>
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Download the full-sized version of this post as a PDF file <a href="http://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/significant-offensives-syria-june-6-june-9-2015" target="_blank">here</a>.</div>
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<span style="color: #bf9000; font-size: large;"><b>1.</b></span> June 5 - 17: The JN-led Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room launched an offensive on June 5 which successfully seized the town of Mahambel and seven other villages along the Latakia – Idlib Highway, largely eliminating the remaining regime-held salient in Idlib Province. Rebel forces with the Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room have since experienced difficulty in seizing remaining regime positions south of Jisr al-Shughour in southwestern Idlib Province or along the al-Ghab Plain in northwestern Hama Province. </div>
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<span style="color: #bf9000; font-size: large;"><b>2.</b></span> June 9 - 12: A number of FSA-affiliated and Islamist rebel factions announced the “Battle of Retribution for the Martyrs” on June 9 and seized the regime-held Brigade 52 base in eastern Dera’a Province following heavy clashes with regime forces. The same rebel forces later announced the “Battle of Crush the Tyrants” targeting the Tha’lah Airbase in western Suwayda Province, making initial gains before being repulsed following the arrival of Druze reinforcements.</div>
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<span style="color: #bf9000; font-size: large;"><b>3.</b></span> June 16 - 29: Four separate rebel coalitions, including the newly-formed JN-led Jaysh al-Fatah al-Mintaqa al-Janoubiyah and two distinct operations rooms led by elements of the FSA-affiliated Southern Front, launched offensives targeting regime military positions in northern Quneitra Province in the vicinity of Druze-inhabited Mount Hermon. The stated goals of the offensives included a desire to open supply lines leading to rebel forces in the Western Ghouta suburbs of Damascus. Nonetheless, the offensives ultimately achieved only limited gains in the area as rebel forces came under pressure from clashes against alleged ISIS-affiliated rebels in western Dera’a Province, the joint Hezbollah-regime offensive on Zabadani northwest of Damascus, and Israeli warnings of a possible military intervention in the event of an attack against the pro-regime Druze of Mount Hermon.</div>
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<span style="color: #bf9000; font-size: large;"><b>4.</b></span> June 25 - 30: Rebel forces with the FSA-affiliated Southern Front announced the "Battle of Southern Storm" on June 25 directed at seizing Dera'a City as the next phase of an effort to consolidate control over southern Syria and set conditions for an eventual assault against the Syrian capital of Damascus. Although rebel forces initially made limited tactical gains within Dera'a City, the offensive largely quieted by June 30 due to a rumored operational reassessment following high casualties and poor coordination between rebel forces. Rebel commanders nonetheless continue to insist that the “Battle of Southern Storm” will not be called off. </div>
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<span style="color: #bf9000; font-size: large;"><b>5.</b></span> July 2 – 8: The Fatah Halab Operations Room announced the start of the “Battle of Fatah Halab” on July 2 to seize full control over regime-held portions of Aleppo City. Combined moderate and Islamist rebel forces later seized control of the regime-held Scientific Research Center on the western outskirts of Aleppo City on July 3 amidst ongoing clashes as rebels attempted to break into the New Aleppo and az-Zahraa neighborhoods of northwestern Aleppo City. Meanwhile, JN and a number of Salafi-jihadist rebel factions also announced the formation of the Ansar al-Sharia Operations Room on July 2 and launched a parallel offensive against regime positions in the az-Zahraa district which has included at least one JN suicide attack against regime forces.</div>
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<b><u>REGIME</u>:</b></div>
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<span style="color: red; font-size: large;"><b>6.</b></span> June 20 - 23: The regime reportedly deployed reinforcements including the elite ‘Tiger Forces’ Special Forces unit to the western countryside of Palmyra, sparking clashes with ISIS west of the city as well as in the nearby Sha’er and Jazal Gas Fields. Although regime officials have messaged an intent to recapture the city of Palmyra from ISIS forces, no notable offensive action has yet occurred. </div>
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<span style="color: red; font-size: large;"><b>7.</b></span> July 2 - 7: Lebanese Hezbollah and Syrian regime forces announced the start of an offensive to seize the rebel-held town of Zabadani northwest of Damascus near the Lebanese border on July 2. Zabadani occupies a key position near supply routes connecting Damascus to Hezbollah positions in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley. Clashes are currently ongoing as Hezbollah and regime forces attempt to enter the town from the west amidst clashes with JN, Ahrar al-Sham, and other rebel factions. </div>
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<span style="color: #674ea7; font-size: large;"><b>8.</b></span><span style="color: #8e7cc3;"> </span>June 6 - 23: Kurdish YPG forces supported by FSA-affiliated rebel factions and U.S.-led coalition airstrikes continued offensive operations to seize ISIS territory in northern Syria, seizing the ISIS-held border crossing of Tel Abyad on June 15 before moving south to capture the town of Ayn Issa and its associated Brigade 93 military base on June 22-23. These gains provided a ground link between the Kurdish Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) and Hasaka Province (Cizire) cantons while placing joint YPG-FSA forces thirty miles north of the ISIS stronghold of ar-Raqqa City. Nonetheless, the YPG advance also elevated tensions with Turkey, which deployed military forces to its border amidst heightened concerns over “border security”. </div>
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<b><u>ISIS</u>:</b></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><b>9.</b></span> June 24 – July 7: ISIS launched a major offensive against regime positions in Hasaka City on June 24, seizing several of the city’s southern districts after heavy clashes which included a series of SVBIED attacks against both regime and Kurdish security installations. Regime forces reportedly began to reverse ISIS gains by the end of June following the deployment of Republican Guard reinforcements from Deir ez-Zour City, the arrival of SAA and NDF reinforcements from Qamishli, and the limited assistance provided by YPG forces in the eastern neighborhoods of the city. Nonetheless, local reports indicate that ISIS has secured additional advances against the regime in southern Hasaka City following a renewed wave of SVBIED and VBIED attacks beginning on July 1.</div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><b>10.</b></span> June 25 - July 6: ISIS launched a number of counterattacks against Kurdish-held terrain following the YPG successes at Tel Abyad and Ayn Issa in early June. A group of ISIS infiltrators equipped with at least two SVBIEDs entered the town of Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) on June 25, sparking two days of clashes which left over two hundred civilians dead. ISIS militants launched similar infiltrator attacks against two towns on the east bank of the Euphrates River on June 26 and against the recently-seized town of Tel Abyad on June 30. ISIS later launched a counterattack against joint YPG-FSA forces in Ayn Issa north of ar-Raqqa City on July 5 which included at least two SVBIED detonations; clashes are ongoing. </div>
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<b>KEY TAKEAWAY:</b> Syrian rebel factions have launched long-awaited offensives against the isolated provincial capitals of Dera’a and Aleppo Cities, located in southern and northern Syria respectively. These two cities represent key lynchpins in the regime's ‘army in all corners’ strategy which allows Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to claim control over all of Syria. The fall of either city to rebel forces including Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra would overturn the stalemate that has long characterized the Syrian Civil War, opening the door to further offensives against core regime terrain in Damascus and the Syrian Coast. Rebel forces have thus far achieved limited success in both cities, however, amidst reports of high casualties and poor coordination between rebel factions – in part due to friction between moderate Free Syrian Army (FSA)-affiliated rebel factions and more extreme groups led by Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). If the rebel campaigns to seize Aleppo and Dera’a Cities stall over the coming weeks, JN and other Salafi-jihadist groups could seize the opportunity to expand their leadership role within the Syrian opposition by emphasizing the gains previously achieved in Idlib Province when rebel factions united under JN’s leadership. Rebel efforts in Aleppo and Dera’a Provinces have also been handicapped by the need to respond to the threat posed by ISIS and ISIS-sympathetic rebel brigades, which have encroached upon opposition-held terrain in both the northern countryside of Aleppo City and the southwestern countryside of Dera’a Province.</div>
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The regime’s successful defense of Aleppo and Dera’a Cities thus far belies that fact that the continued dedication of valuable combat resources to outlying “corners” of Syria risks overextending the defensive capabilities of regime forces. The regime appears particularly vulnerable to an offensive by ISIS against the Syrian central corridor while regime forces are fixed in northern and southern Syria. Although ISIS has directed its main effort in Syria over the past month against Kurdish YPG forces in northern Syria in a likely effort to protect ar-Raqqa City, ISIS remains a critical threat to both the regime’s core territory and its remaining remote outposts in eastern Syria. ISIS continued to launch probing attacks against rebel forces in the Eastern Qalamoun Mountains and regime positions in eastern Hama and Homs Provinces in a likely bid to seek opportunities for further territorial advancement in the vicinity of against Homs, Hama, and Damascus Cities meant to balance losses in northern Syria and Iraq. Meanwhile, a major offensive by ISIS against Hasaka City in northeastern Syria forced the regime to deploy valuable elite Republican Guard units away from Deir ez-Zour City in a move possibly designed to weaken the regime's defenses there. The combined effects of these pressures taken in conjunction with ongoing rebel offensives could ultimately force the Syrian regime into an unwilling contraction, generating additional opportunities for ISIS to expand. </div>
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The initiatives undertaken by the Syrian regime and its foreign backers during this reporting period suggest that the regime may be preparing for such an outcome. Regime forces have reportedly begun large-scale fortification efforts along the approaches to Damascus and Latakia in order to protect the regime’s core terrain in western Syria. Meanwhile, Hezbollah and regime forces have directed offensive operations to clear the remaining rebel presence in the Qalamoun Mountains along the Lebanese border – a necessary precondition for the formation of a loyalist rump state with connectivity to Hezbollah-dominated regions of Lebanon. In light of these observations, the deployment of elite regime combat units to regions west of Palmyra in central Syria may also constitute a defensive maneuver to buffer the Syrian central corridor against further ISIS advances rather than a decisive effort to recapture the city as hinted by senior regime officials. Overall, the limited offensive maneuvers conducted by the Syrian regime in recent months suggest that the regime’s capacity to set the terms of battle and dictate the trajectory of the Syrian Civil War may have been significantly degraded by the concurrent pressures of rebel and ISIS offensives.</div>
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Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-67917096064285904362015-07-02T13:03:00.000-07:002015-07-02T15:32:51.619-07:00Rebels Launch New Offensive in Southern Syria<div style="text-align: center;">
<i><span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">by: Jennifer Cafarella</span></i></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Rebel
forces in Southern Syria have mobilized for what they hope will be the final
phase of a major campaign to force the regime to withdraw from Southern Syria. Should they succeed, they may achieve enough
momentum to advance to Damascus and may force the Assad regime to contract from
outlying areas, including southern, eastern, and northern Syria where the
regime is also challenged. A successful operation by rebels in Southern Syria
could therefore alter the stalemate of the Syrian war even though rebels across
northern and southern Syria are not coordinated. Rebels in Southern Syria
represent a strong potential partner for the U.S. not only to end the Syrian war,
but also to limit the expansion of ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria. The moderate
rebel Southern Front coalition has played a leading role in Southern Syria since
the summer of 2014, a distinction from other fronts on which moderate rebels
play a minimal role. Islamists brigades have fought alongside them, however, and
Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) has supported their effort,
indicating that the influence of moderate rebels in Southern Syria is
vulnerable. While their tactical cooperation may improve their chances of
driving pro-regime forces from southern Dera’a province, it may also limit
future opportunities for the U.S. to capitalize upon their success if moderate
rebels are not empowered to remain in the lead through increased international support.
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Syrian
rebel forces in the moderate Southern Front Coalition <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1sFz0nwHEeo">declared</a>
“Battle of Southern Storm” in Dera’a Province on June 24, 2015. The objective
of the Battle of Southern Storm appears to be to oust the regime from of Dera’a
Province and to set conditions for an eventual assault on Damascus. After <a href="http://aawsat.com/home/article/391851/%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%AF-%C2%AB%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%81%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8%C2%BB-%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%89-%D8%A5%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86">allowing</a> one day for civilians to <a href="http://aawsat.com/home/article/391851/%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%AF-%C2%AB%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%81%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8%C2%BB-%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%89-%D8%A5%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86">evacuate</a> the city, rebels launched a <a href="http://www.all4syria.info/Archive/226865">“large
scale”</a> <a href="http://all4syria.info/Archive/226923">attack</a> against pro-regime forces in
Dera’a City on June 25. Rebels made initial advances, <a href="https://www.zamanalwsl.net/news/62007.html">seizing</a>
the Dera'a National Hospital and a regime-held checkpoint near the Bassel
al-Assad Stadium in northern Dera'a City, significant because Dera’a city has
not been an active frontline over the past year. Regime forces <a href="http://www.syriahr.com/en/2015/06/the-battle-of-aasefat-al-janoub-starts-and-more-that-51-rebel-and-islamic-factions-aim-to-seize-the-city-of-daraa-and-its-vicinity/">responded</a> with a major increase in aerial
bombardment including over 60 barrel bombs in Dera’a City and its outskirts on
June 25 alone. Clashes remain ongoing as of July 2 with the <a href="http://www.syriahr.com/en/2015/06/the-battle-of-aasefat-al-janoub-starts-and-more-that-51-rebel-and-islamic-factions-aim-to-seize-the-city-of-daraa-and-its-vicinity/">participation</a> of Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate
Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and other hardline Islamist brigades, although it is
unclear which side is currently gaining momentum. The initial JN and rebel
gains in Dera’a City are a notable escalation, though they do not yet
constitute a sufficient challenge to pro-regime forces in the city to prompt a
regime withdrawal. The “Battle of Southern Storm” however will likely not be
restricted to Dera’a city, but rather target the breadth of regime outposts
remaining in Dera’a province. </span><br />
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<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-ThHv1E_eB7k/VZW72iMjiUI/AAAAAAAADnY/2maGs8Sugio/s1600/Dera%2527a%2BJoe%2BMap%2BJune%2B2014-01%2Bpng%2Bhigh.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-ThHv1E_eB7k/VZW72iMjiUI/AAAAAAAADnY/2maGs8Sugio/s1600/Dera%2527a%2BJoe%2BMap%2BJune%2B2014-01%2Bpng%2Bhigh.png" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Primarily
moderate rebel forces supported by JN and other Islamist rebels set the
conditions for this offensive through a yearlong campaign to eliminate major
regime-held military bases in the Dera’a and Quneitra countryside. This
preparation of the battlefield reflects a long-term campaign design, of which
the latest battle for Dera’a City is a recent component. Beginning in June
2014, combined anti-Assad forces successfully restricted the regime to an
isolated salient that connects Damascus to Dera’a City. The spokesperson for the
Battle of Southern Storm on June 24, 2015 <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sp6B9Qa8NbQ">designated</a>
this entire stretch of regime-held terrain as a military zone, indicating that
the battle is not limited to Dera’a City, but rather is intended to “liberate”
the entirety of Dera’a Province. The initial goal of the offensive is to force
the regime to fall back to the regime stronghold of Izra’a, north of Dera’a
City, <a href="http://www.all4syria.info/Archive/227148">according</a> to the deputy commander of a
prominent moderate brigade participating in the operation named the Yarmouk
Army. If successful, this offensive could allow rebel forces to consolidate in
southern Dera’a Province before advancing northward toward Damascus.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><i>Moderate
and Islamist Rebels Establish New Command-and-Control Structures</i><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">The
list of participating rebel brigades in the Battle of Southern Storm is
currently unclear. It is possible that negotiations are still ongoing between
the Southern Front, JN, and Islamist brigades, which could account for the slow
start to the offensive. According to a Southern Front representative, the
offensive is coordinated through a “higher central <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f3K7qgjuUu4">operations room</a>,” which appears to be a new structure established for
the purposes of this offensive beginning in June 2015. According to the Yarmouk
Army deputy commander, the Battle of Southern Storm <a href="http://www.all4syria.info/Archive/227148">involves</a> seven geographically based
operations rooms, the term that opposition forces use for headquarters that
ensure unity of effort across different groups on the battlefield. The
commander did not disclose the composition or location of these operations
rooms, which likely include both moderate and Islamist brigades across multiple
front lines in southern Syria.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</div>
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<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-mPgBV6oo52I/VZWYfwJT_EI/AAAAAAAADnI/4lv2QsmSiK8/s1600/Southern%2BFront%2BJoint%2BCommand%2BPalantir%2BChart-01.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-mPgBV6oo52I/VZWYfwJT_EI/AAAAAAAADnI/4lv2QsmSiK8/s1600/Southern%2BFront%2BJoint%2BCommand%2BPalantir%2BChart-01.png" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Prior to the declaration of the Battle of Southern Storm, the
Southern Front created a new coordinative body in an attempt to formalize its
command and control of the more than 40 brigades within the Southern Front. The
relationship between this new body and the Battle of Southern Storm operations
room is unclear. The role of the Southern Front coalition in rebel military
campaigns was previously limited to unifying the political programs and social
media efforts of numerous brigades, many of which receive support from regional
and Western backers through a <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/syrian-rebels-get-arms-and-advice-through-secret-command-centre-in-amman" title="http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/syrian-rebels-get-arms-and-advice-through-secret-command-centre-in-amman Ctrl+Click or tap to follow the link">Military Operations Command (MOC)</a> center in Amman, Jordan. The Southern
Front <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vN43vr0wE4Y&feature=youtu.be">announced</a> the establishment of a new Joint Military Command on May 15, 2015
under the leadership of Abu Osama al-Joulani from the First Army, a prominent
rebel coalition folded under the umbrella of the Southern Front. The new joint
command is intended to function as a formal military headquarters with support
staff to coordinate the operations of the Southern Front’s component brigades.
The command includes five subsidiary offices for operations, armament,
logistics, relief, and management. It is unclear whether this joint military
command will succeed in increasing the effectiveness of moderate rebel
operations against the regime, and some Southern Front commanders have
continued to <a href="http://www.all4syria.info/Archive/227138">report</a> inefficiencies in the organization’s operations. Its formation is
nonetheless a notable step forward that could increase the effectiveness of moderate
rebel forces within the Battle of Southern Storm, and it may signal an increase
in support provided to the Southern Front by outside backers in the MOC. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Islamist
forces supported by JN also created new formal military alliances<span class="MsoCommentReference"><span style="line-height: 107%;"> </span></span>in the lead-up to the
declaration of the Battle of Southern Storm. JN, the Ahrar al-Sham
Islamic Movement (HASI), and eight primarily Islamist brigades <a href="https://zamanalwsl.net/news/61696.html">announced</a> the formation of the
Harmoun Army in northern Quneitra Province on June 16. Then, on June 20, JN,
HASI, and seven other Islamist rebel groups <a href="http://www.syriahr.com/2015/06/%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%AD-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86/">announced</a> the formation of the
Jaysh al-Fatah [“Army of Conquest”] “southern sector” in order “to unify rebel
ranks” to combat both “domestic and foreign challenges,” a likely reference to
outside funding and military support <span class="MsoCommentReference"><span style="line-height: 107%;"> </span></span>received by many Southern Front rebel brigades. Jaysh al-Fatah
includes relatively small brigades that are loosely associated with the
Southern Front in addition to the primarily Islamist Fatah al-Sham operations
room. The exact relationship between the Harmoun Army and Jaysh al-Fatah is
unclear, but the participation of JN and HASI in both structures indicates that
there is likely substantial coordination between the two. Both groups also
operate in close proximity to the moderate A'sifa al-Haqq Operations Room based
in northwestern Dera’a Province and led by the moderate Southern Front’s First
Army. The Harmoun Army, Jaysh al-Fatah, and A’sifa al-Haqq constitute lower
echelon military structures that each coordinates the activities of numerous
rebel brigades, and in the case of the Harmoun Army and Jaysh al-Fatah, their
operations extend farther into southern Syria. Where their operations are
co-located southwest of Damascus, it is possible these three smaller coalitions<span class="MsoCommentReference"><span style="line-height: 107%;"> </span></span>will achieve unity of
effort against the regime through one local operations room within the Battle
for Southern Storm despite their ideological differences. The question of JN’s
increased influence or dominance over moderate rebel structures remains a
concern given this potential development.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Rebel Attempts to Limit al-Qaeda
Affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">There
are other causes of concern. The Jaysh al-Fatah southern sector is a repeat of
a successful model for military operations established by JN and Islamist
forces in Idlib Province. The <a href="http://iswsyria.blogspot.com/">creation</a> of the original Jaysh
al-Fatah operations room in Idlib Province enabled JN and Islamist forces to
seize control of a majority of Idlib Province from pro-regime forces beginning
in March 2015. JN <a href="https://twitter.com/gyshfathqalamon/status/595519928091967489">established</a> a <a href="http://www.all4syria.info/Archive/210402">second</a> version of the Jaysh
al-Fatah model in the Qalamoun region of the Damascus Countryside in April 2015,
and has since <a href="http://www.all4syria.info/Archive/222371">called for the</a> establishment of a
Jaysh al-Fatah version in the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus.<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_ednref1"></a> JN’s ability to export this model indicates its growing
momentum in Syria and its continued significance as a military power in the
fight against Assad. JN’s intent to <a href="http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/JN%20Final.pdf">leverage</a> its influence within
these structures to shape rebel governance structures and religious activity
appears to have prompted some Islamist groups to <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charles-lister/an-internal-struggle-al-q_b_7479730.html">pressure</a> JN quietly to relinquish
its al-Qaeda affiliation. JN’s leader Abu Mohammed al-Joulani rejected this
proposal in a two-part interview with <i>al-Jazeera</i> in May and June through
which he firmly <a href="http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Threat%20of%20New%20Al-Qaeda%20Leadership.pdf">reasserted</a> JN’s allegiance to
al-Qaeda. Islamist forces are likely to continue to accommodate JN’s al-Qaeda
character as long as combined JN-Islamist operations against the regime
continue to achieve success.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Moderate rebel forces seek to limit JN’s influence in a future
post-Assad Syrian state. JN’s deepening role within Islamist structures
counters this effort by ensuring JN’s staying power within the province. The
Southern Front increased its rhetoric against JN in early 2015, likely prompted
by JN’s increasingly overt links to al-Qaeda in public statements. In early
April 2015, six rebel brigades <a href="http://www.shaam.org/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%88-%D8%A3%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%83%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%83%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%8A.html">released</a> <a href="https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1428067834160929">statements</a> condemning JN’s
transnational agenda. After the formation of Jaysh al-Fatah, the Southern Front
released a <a href="https://zamanalwsl.net/news/61905.html">statement</a> distancing itself from
the new operations room, accusing Jaysh al-Fatah of imposing its own
“unnationalistic” agenda against the will of the Syrian people. A number of
Southern Front affiliates also <a href="https://twitter.com/Charles_Lister/status/612884605155328000/photo/1">released</a> independent <a href="https://twitter.com/mmn_re_123/status/612698194397499393">statements</a> confirming their
refusal to cooperate with Jaysh al-Fatah, including the First Army, Seif
al-Sham Brigades, and the 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division. These statements
reaffirm the commitment of Southern-Front affiliated brigades to establishing a
secular and democratic post-Assad Syrian state in the face of growing JN
prominence, possibly in order to satisfy outside supporters. The statements are
likely also an attempt to encourage rebel brigades to refrain from deepening
their cooperation with JN in Southern Syria by placing a stigma on military
structures with overt JN participation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">There is nonetheless little indication that the Southern Front
will actually terminate its military cooperation with JN in the near term.
Statements by moderate rebel brigades have not resulted in observable changes
on the battlefield, where JN, Islamist, and moderate rebel forces continue to
operate in close proximity. The Jaysh al-Fatah operations room and the Southern
front reportedly <a href="http://www.ibtimes.com/syrian-rebel-groups-merge-take-assad-deraa-deep-divisions-remain-1984616">confirmed</a> their cooperation
prior to the declaration of the Battle of Southern Storm and may have actually
formalized their relationship. The participation of JN and Islamist rebels in
clashes in Dera’a City, as well as the inclusion of Southern Front-affiliated
brigades in the Jaysh al-Fatah coalition, furthermore indicates that
segregation between moderates and JN-allied Islamists is unlikely to emerge in
Southern Syria. In fact, <a href="https://www.zamanalwsl.net/news/62060.html">according</a> to “informed” pro-rebel sources cited by the Syrian activist
network Zaman al-Wasl, efforts are underway to “enhance” the coordination
between the Southern Front, JN, and Islamist rebels. A rebel source <a href="https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/10565.html">claimed</a> that there are 40
suicide bombers ready for deployment in the Battle of Southern Storm, likely
confirming that JN will contribute directly to offensives led by primarily
moderate brigades.<span class="MsoEndnoteReference"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">The
trend in Southern Syria points toward deeper cross-spectrum integration of
anti-Assad actors in the absence of direct outside intervention. Additional
success against Assad will therefore likely come at the cost of the continued
rise to influence of JN and its Islamist allies. Public statements by moderate
rebel commanders reflect this reality. In interviews with Syrian activist
networks, moderate rebel commanders have consistently <a href="http://all4syria.info/Archive/228015">deflected</a> questions regarding how to
navigate differences between Islamists and moderates in a post-Assad
environment. While moderate rebels have become more willing to criticize JN’s
vision, they continue to refrain from condemning the Islamist agenda held by
other rebel groups such as HASI in favor of remaining united in the fight
against Assad. This overall prioritization of the fall of the Assad regime
above other long-term questions is a characteristic of Syrian rebel brigades
across front lines from northern to southern Syria. Recognizing this reality is
a necessary precondition of fruitful engagement with Syrian rebel forces in an
effort to accelerate an end to the Syrian war. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><i>Effect
on the Regime</i><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">The
Battle of Southern Storm nevertheless threatens the Assad regime at a
particularly vulnerable time. The regime is facing challenges to its remaining
outposts on multiple fronts, including Deir ez Zour and Hasaka in the east,
Idlib and Hama in the north, and Homs and Qalamoun in central Syria. The
seizure of Dera’a City by anti-Assad forces could be a sufficient turning point
in the Syrian war to prompt a regime contraction out of Southern Syria toward
the Syrian capital, despite the fact that anti-Assad actors in northern,
eastern, and southern Syria are not coordinated. Alternately, it is possible
that remaining pro-regime forces in Dera’a City are sufficiently capable to
resist combined anti-Assad forces. There is <a href="http://www.all4syria.info/Archive/227148">reportedly</a> a regime special
operations headquarters at the Dera’a City municipal<span class="MsoCommentReference"><span style="line-height: 107%;"> </span></span>stadium that includes
Iranian-sponsored forces. Iran may choose to increase its direct support to
Assad in order to forestall regime defeat at Dera’a City. The defeat of the
stronghold of Iranian-sponsored paramilitary forces in Busra al-Sham by
combined JN, Islamist, and moderate rebels on <a href="http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2015/Mar-25/292097-syrian-rebels-seize-town-in-south-activists.ashx">March 24th</a> indicates, however,
that even additional Iranian support may be insufficient to retain Dera’a City.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">The
regime has substantial military fortifications north of Dera’a City on the
Damascus-Dera’a Highway that it could choose to reinforce in the event of a loss
at Dera’a City in order to blunt further rebel advances toward the capital. The
regime likely does not possess sufficient manpower reserves, however, to do so,
especially under <a href="http://iswsyria.blogspot.com/2015/05/isis-control-and-expected-offensives-in.html">growing strain</a> from ISIS in <a href="http://iswsyria.blogspot.com/2015/05/isis-control-and-expected-offensives-in.html">Eastern Homs</a>, <a href="https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/565341-syria-regime-prepares-deir-ezzor-evacuation?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter">Deir ez-Zour</a>, and <a href="http://www.all4syria.info/Archive/227201">Hasaka</a> Provinces. The regime is therefore
unlikely to succeed in holding an interim defensive line near Izra’a and could
choose to withdraw to a more defensible perimeter around Damascus if rebel
forces begin to seize greater terrain. This would likely involve a full
withdrawal from Dera’a and Suwayda Provinces, and possibly from remaining
regime strongholds in northern Quneitra Province, or conversely a surge of
pro-regime activity in Quneitra province, strategically positioned next to the
Golan Heights. Such a contraction would cause a major shift in the Syrian war,
likely requiring Assad to abandon his current strategic objective to maintain
his claim to the entirety of Syria.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">The
regime has reportedly begun to increase its fortification of Damascus,
potentially signaling that it intends to harden the capital against future
rebel assault as a defensive priority. Existing military fortifications on the high
ground on the southern outskirts of the capital, originally intended to blunt
an Israeli armored advance from the Golan Heights, provide an existing line of
defense that the regime could sufficiently consolidate by withdrawing forces
from Dera’a. Regime forces began <a href="http://www.all4syria.info/Archive/226294">constructing</a> nearly two kilometers of earthen
berms along the Old Dera'a Highway and the Hawsh Belas Industrial Complex south
of Damascus on June 23 in an effort to fortify the southern and southwestern
entrances to the capital. In a worst-case scenario, the regime may even
calculate that chemical weapons will be necessary to halt rebel gains or screen
a withdrawal from southern Syria. A report citing U.S. intelligence officials,
released on June 28, warned that the regime’s situation may be growing
sufficiently dire to prompt the regime to use remaining vestiges of the its <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/assad-chemical-threat-mounts-1435535977">chemical weapons</a> stockpile, which experts think
Assad may possess.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">There
have been multiple indicators of the regime’s unease over its disposition in
southern Syria. At least two separate groups of pro-regime soldiers have <a href="http://syriadirect.org/news/syria-direct-news-update-6-15-15/">defected</a> to rebel ranks since the beginning
of 2015, highlighting declining morale. Iranian officers reportedly <a href="https://www.zamanalwsl.net/news/61953.html">executed</a>
regime officers in the Dera’a City Municipal Stadium, likely in an attempt to
deter further defections or punish perceived failings on the battlefield.
Meanwhile, the regime continues to struggle to rally the minority Druze
population of neighboring Suwayda Province to replenish pro-regime ranks. Druze
residents have <a href="http://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/druze-unrest-could-transform-syrian-conflict">actively resisted </a>attempts to implement forced
conscription campaigns in Suwayda Province and Druze elders have <a href="http://syriadirect.org/news/as-tensions-with-bedouins-percolate-druze-leaders-%E2%80%98do-not-want-sectarianism%E2%80%99/">articulated</a> a policy of restrained
self-defense and neutrality in the fighting between regime and rebel forces.
Roughly 100 newly enlisted Druze soldiers <a href="http://syriadirect.org/news/syria-direct-news-update-6-24-15/">fled</a> their posts in Eastern Suwayda
Province on June 24, allegedly in response to the regime’s intent to deploy
them into Eastern Dera’a Province. If the regime contemplates a partition, it
is likely that the Druze will prevent the regime from withdrawing its armor
from Suwayda Province and opt for allegiance with Syrian rebels. Druze fighters
have <a href="http://syriadirect.org/news/druze-militiamen-block-regime-weapons-from-leaving-suwayda/">intervened</a> <a href="http://syriadirect.org/news/another-regime-convoy-reportedly-blocked-by-druze-from-leaving-province/">twice</a> since the beginning of 2015 to
prevent the regime from deploying armored columns out of Suwayda Province,
likely in order to ensure the Druze population has sufficient military
resources to ensure its own protection.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<i><span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Setting
the Conditions for Damascus?<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">The
desire to advance against Damascus in the long-term is a common objective that
will likely continue to unite moderate, JN, and Islamist forces on an
operational level. The Southern Front in particular has consistently messaged
its operations in Dera’a and Quneitra Provinces as condition-setting efforts
for a drive to Damascus. The inclusion of prominent Damascus-based rebel
commanders into the Southern Front joint command could also indicate the active
preparation for a future Damascus offensive. In addition to its five offices,
the joint command includes a delegate from the Qalamoun region of the northern
Damascus countryside, Bakkour al-Salim, the former leader of the FSA-affiliated
Damascus Military Council. The Southern Front has historically included
Qalamoun in its claimed area of operations, so the inclusion of Salim into the
Southern Front joint command is not necessarily a departure that signals
near-term intent to conduct major operations in Damascus. Nonetheless, the
inclusion of prominent Damascus-based rebel commanders in the Southern Front
joint command indicates that the Southern Front retains a strategic vision that
involves leveraging advances in southern Syria into eventual gains in the
Syrian capital.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">More
notable are reports of increasing negotiation between the Southern Front and
prominent Islamist brigades based in Damascus. These talks with actors not
historically associated with the Southern Front could indicate active efforts
to cultivate a new Damascus front as a follow-on operation to the Battle of
Southern Storm. Prominent Damascus based Islamist commander Zahran Alloush, the
leader of Jaysh al-Islam, has allegedly decreased his direct oversight of rebel
operations in the capital in order to participate in a series of meetings with
regional actors<a href="http://all4syria.info/Archive/219315"><span style="color: windowtext; text-decoration: none;">. </span>Abu
Mohammad al-Fateh</a>,
the leader of another Damascus based Islamist group named the Ajnad al-Sham
Islamic Union, has reportedly filled in as the leader of the Damascus rebel
coalition the Eastern Ghouta Unified Command in Alloush’s absence. Alloush <a href="http://iswsyria.blogspot.com/2015/05/warning-intelligence-update-possible.html">reportedly arrived</a> in Turkey on April 17 for a series
of undisclosed talks, including a meeting with members of HASI leadership.
Then, on June 6, unconfirmed reports indicated that Alloush <a href="http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/is-zahran-alloush-in-amman-by-aron-lund/">traveled</a> to Amman, Jordan, in order to meet
with foreign intelligence officials and Syrian rebel commanders. According to
one report, this meeting focused on discussing options to counter both ISIS and
al-Qaeda in Syria. Rumors circulating on Twitter meanwhile alleged that the <a href="https://twitter.com/mujtahidd/status/606953591404929025">intelligence</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/mujtahidd/status/606954661795532800">officials</a> asked <a href="https://twitter.com/mujtahidd/status/606953868988153857">Alloush</a> to <a href="https://twitter.com/mujtahidd/status/606953868988153857">coordinate</a> with the <a href="https://twitter.com/mujtahidd/status/606953902395781120">Southern Front</a> against <a href="https://twitter.com/mujtahidd/status/606955448881823744">ISIS and JN</a> in both <a href="https://twitter.com/mujtahidd/status/606953951536250881">Dera'a and Quneitra Provinces</a>, and discussed the potential for replacing
Jaysh al-Islam’s flag with the Syrian Revolutionary flag. Alloush has also
begun to step back from his previously sectarian rhetoric, most notably during
an <a href="http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/middle-east/article24784780.html">interview</a> with McClatchy DC in which Alloush
referred to the Alawite sect as “part of the Syrian people”. This appears to
confirm that outside supporters of Alloush, namely Saudi Arabia, and of the
Southern Front broadly are actively exploring options to achieve unity of
effort across previously disparate moderate and Islamist rebel ranks. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<i><span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Implications
for U.S. Policy<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">The
emerging situation in Southern Syria provides a new opportunity for the U.S. to
engage in Syria. The aggregate effects of the rebel campaign in Southern Syria,
recent JN and rebel victories in Idlib Province, and continued pressure by ISIS
on the Assad regime across multiple fronts may sufficiently disrupt the regime
to render a feasible end to the Syrian war. A reevaluation of the scope of the
U.S. train and assist program can generate meaningful ground partnerships if it
accommodates a wider mission in Syria, namely helping rather than discouraging
rebels from their primary effort to overthrow Assad. Especially given the
recently <a href="http://www.worldbulletin.net/middle-east/161073/syrian-opp-withdraw-from-us-train-and-equip-program">confirmed</a> defection of another vetted unit
of Syrian rebels from the program, the program as it stands currently is not
poised to have a positive impact upon either the Syrian war or the war against
ISIS. The moderate rebel Southern Front on the other hand offers a compelling
option for direct U.S. engagement under an altered policy framework. The
Southern Front does not, however, present a full solution. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">The
U.S. could consider the possibility of leveraging select Islamist rebels as
allies alongside the Southern Front. Even strong moderate rebels in Southern
Syria are insufficient to defeat Assad or to ensure the establishment of a
stable post-Assad Syrian state capable of addressing the threats of al-Qaeda
and ISIS. The involvement of powerful Islamist rebel groups that are not committed
to JN may therefore be critical for achieving success in Syria. A spectrum of
Islamist brigades exists in Syria, ranging from hardline groups with close
ideological affiliation with JN to more mainstream groups with a desire for
Shari’a law to inform a post-Assad Syrian state. The U.S. has the option to
engage with the latter category, namely mainstream independent Islamist groups that
are fighting alongside moderate forces. Attempts by the moderate Southern Front
to negotiate constructive relationships with Islamist brigades, possibly
including some Damascus-based Islamists, signal an opportunity for the U.S. and
regional partners to capitalize on existing options for cross-spectrum rebel
coordination that does not cater directly to al-Qaeda’s interests. This engagement
must extend to northern Syria, where moderates and Islamists continue to work
in close coordination against the regime, but also where moderates are
operating at a relative disadvantage. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">A
carefully tailored engagement with some Syrian Islamist groups could enable the
U.S to take action to contain and diminish JN’s influence in Syria. It is
critical that the U.S. take action to reverse the formalized coordination
between JN and Islamist forces that translated into <a href="http://alhayat.com/Articles/8325123">joint</a> JN and Islamist governance
structures within Idlib City after seizing the City in March 2015. A similar
development in Southern Syria may become likely if the Battle of Southern Storm
succeeds, in which the Southern Front is compelled to accept the involvement of
JN and Islamist actors in post-Assad institutions. Over the long term, this
embedded JN presence is a strategic threat for the U.S. because of the staying
power and access to resources it provides to al-Qaeda in Syria. The U.S. could
leverage increased support to both moderate and select Islamist forces to
appeal to more hardline Islamist groups such as HASI to abandon their
allegiance to JN. HASI’s participation in cross-spectrum rebel efforts to
establish a united political program, notably through the Syrian Revolutionary
Command Council based in Turkey, indicates that the U.S. could likely succeed
in this effort. The U.S. should nonetheless be prepared for JN to attempt to
rally its rebel allies to resist the U.S. and fight U.S.-supported rebels. With
sufficient U.S. commitment, however, JN will be unable to sustain this
narrative in the long term. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">A
defeat of the regime in southern Syria will likely produce escalating violence in
the absence of intervention to mitigate potential risks. Rebel advances will
likely provoke the regime to resort to desperate tactics such as the use of
residual chemical weapons capability in order to forestall defeat in Southern
Syria or facilitate a regime contraction. In the absence of overt support by
the U.S. or regional actors to Syrian rebels, the regime may calculate that it
can act with impunity and continue its escalation against civilians. Further
atrocity by the Syrian regime could prompt retributive attacks by Syrian rebel
groups against pro-regime populations, such as those in remaining besieged
enclaves north of Aleppo City and northeast of Idlib City. JN will <a href="http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/SYR%20COAs%20Backgrounder.pdf">likely</a> capitalize on escalating violence
in order to propagate its sectarian narrative, and possibly generate support
for a campaign against the coastal Alawite heartland. This increased
destabilization within the Syrian Civil War will provide opportunities for ISIS
to expand, potentially encouraging ISIS to launch a major spectacular attack
against a major regime target such as Homs City.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Furthermore,
the narrow focus of the U.S. on a counter-ISIS mission despite these realities
risks encouraging regional actors to undertake unilateral action, which could
actually provoke further instability and spillover of the Syrian war.
Unconfirmed reports have emerged that <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-foreign-minister-possible-syria-operations-to-be-announced-after-mgk-meeting.aspx?pageID=238&nid=84676&NewsCatID=510">indicate</a> <a href="http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2015/Jun-27/304085-turkey-will-never-allow-kurdish-state-in-syria-warns-erdogan.ashx">Turkey</a>, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/29/us-syria-crisis-israel-druze-idUSKCN0P91GN20150629?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews">Israel</a>, and <a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ead1961a-1e38-11e5-ab0f-6bb9974f25d0.html#axzz3efIv4H7C">Jordan</a> are independently contemplating
the establishment of no-fly zones or humanitarian corridors along their
respective borders. For Turkey, the focus is negating the ability of Syrian
Kurds to declare an independent state along the Turkish border, in addition to
likely Turkish desire to resettle Syrian refugees on the Syrian side of the
border. For Israel, the calculation appears to focus on the security of the
Golan Heights border. For Jordan, the consideration of a humanitarian corridor
appears to reflect a desire to prevent JN from ascending further, as it did in
Idlib Province. The vocal reports of the consideration of unilateral measures
by these governments likely signals increasing pressure on the U.S. to
intervene in Syria. If the U.S. continues to ignore their calls for American
leadership, it is a dangerous but likely scenario that the U.S. will ultimately
have to provide that leadership in the future under worse circumstances.</span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">The
U.S. must therefore carefully consider the options for intervention in Syria while
recognizing the likely cost of refraining to act. In mid-2015, a large and
sustained engagement with a spectrum of Syrian rebels as a component of a comprehensive
strategy to end the Syrian war offers the opportunity for the U.S. to
accomplish three strategic objectives in the region: to mitigate the
humanitarian disaster in Syria, to contain and diminish al-Qaeda’s influence,
and to set the conditions to defeat ISIS. Conversely, limited means of
intervention, such as no fly zones, train and assistance only of vetted rebels,
or targeted airstrikes against ISIS and al-Qaeda, incur greater risk of
atrocity and violent extremism if they are not pursued as components of a
strategy to the Syrian war. The forms of limited intervention proposed by
neighboring states meanwhile leave the growing strength of JN in Syria entirely
untouched, presenting a long term and strategic threat in the form of a highly
capable and resilient al-Qaeda affiliate. While the realistic options for
successful intervention are costly, they must nonetheless be considered in
accordance with the likely outcomes of the Syrian Civil War in order to ensure
U.S. national security and stability in the region.</span><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-2482551104368731992015-06-25T11:56:00.000-07:002015-06-25T11:56:32.491-07:00ISIS Counterattacks in Northern Syria<div style="text-align: center;">
<i>by: Christopher Kozak with Jennifer Cafarella</i></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<i><br /></i></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-B8vIH4GI6k8/VYxOYdZxLII/AAAAAAAADlw/powG4Byuy-k/s1600/Military-Situation-in-N-Syria-25-JUN-2015.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-B8vIH4GI6k8/VYxOYdZxLII/AAAAAAAADlw/powG4Byuy-k/s1600/Military-Situation-in-N-Syria-25-JUN-2015.png" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
ISIS launched a series of spectacular
counterattacks on June 24-25 in a two-pronged line of effort targeting Kurdish
and regime forces in northern Syria. ISIS <a href="http://syriadirect.org/news/syria-direct-news-update-6-24-15/">conducted</a>
a wave of suicide attacks in Hasaka City in northeastern Syria on June 24, <a href="http://www.syriahr.com/en/2015/06/3-is-militants-blow-themselves-up-in-the-center-of-al-hasakah-city-killing-and-wounding-at-least-26-members-of-the-regime-forces-while-asayish-conceals-the-casualties/">detonating</a>
two SVBIEDs as well as three or four SVESTs targeting Kurdish internal security
and regime-held checkpoints in a move likely intended to soften the city’s
defenses. ISIS later <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/isis-storms-northeast-syrian-city-of-hassakeh-attacks-kobani-1.3127007?cmp=rss">launched</a>
an offensive against Hasaka City on June 25, detonating at least one VBIED and <a href="http://www.syriahr.com/en/2015/06/is-storm-the-city-of-al-hasakah-and-seize-neighborhoods-in-it-50-deaths-in-the-clashes/">seizing</a>
the regime-held southwestern neighborhoods of the city. ISIS’s advance
allegedly received <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/25/islamic-state-fighters-enter-syria-kobani">support</a>
from tribal fighters previously aligned with the Assad regime. Simultaneously, approximately
thirty to forty ISIS fighters <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/25/us-mideast-crisis-syria-idUSKBN0P50LA20150625?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews">disguised</a>
in Kurdish YPG and Free Syrian Army (FSA) rebel uniforms <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/car-bomb-hits-syria-kobane-isil-attacks-150625050755793.html">infiltrated</a>
the Kurdish border town of Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) on June 25, detonating <a href="http://www.syriahr.com/en/2015/06/violent-clashes-erupt-inside-the-city-of-ayn-al-arab-kobani-and-is-detonate-a-booby-trapped-vehicle-at-morshed-binar-crossing-leaving-dozens-of-victims/">two</a>
<a href="http://www.syriahr.com/en/2015/06/35-civilians-killed-and-wounded-in-a-village-in-the-city-of-ayn-al-arab-kobani-while-the-second-boob-trapped-vehicle-explodes-in-the-city/">SVBIEDs</a>
at the border crossing to Turkey and clashing with YPG forces. <o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify;">
ISIS’s synchronized attacks in northern Syria likely
represent part of an overarching campaign to contain its opponents in the area and
set conditions for further advances in Syria. The attacks in Ayn al-Arab
(Kobani) and Hasaka City appear designed to disrupt ongoing YPG-led anti-ISIS
operations in northern ar-Raqqa Province in order to divert pressure away from
core ISIS terrain in ar-Raqqa City. The scale of the ISIS offensive against
Hasaka City also suggests that ISIS may intend to seize the city to offset
recent losses to Kurdish and rebel forces along the Syrian-Turkish border at
the border crossing of <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/world/middleeast/kurds-and-syrian-rebels-push-to-evict-isis-from-border-town.html?partner=rss&emc=rss">Tel
Abyad</a> as well as the town of <a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/advancing-syria-kurds-close-town-seizing-islamic-state-112608118.html#k66O6KH">Ayn
Issa</a> and its associated Brigade 93 base further south. At minimum, ISIS’s
attacks in Ayn al-Arab and Hasaka City demonstrate that ISIS possesses sufficient
resiliency to absorb losses in northern Syria without losing the capability to
conduct military operations. Alternately, reports indicating that ISIS did not
mount fierce resistance in either Tel Abyad or Ayn Issa suggest that ISIS may
have accepted a degree of calculated risk north of ar-Raqqa City in order to
conserve resources for new lines of effort targeting Hasaka City, central
Syria, or other regions of the country. <o:p></o:p></div>
Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-55307519255672922412015-06-24T08:21:00.000-07:002015-06-24T08:23:49.865-07:00The Regime's Offensive Campaign: Damascus and Environs<div>
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<i><span style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;">This analysis of the Syrian regime’s offensive campaign in Damascus and the nearby environs is adapted from the ISW report </span><a href="http://www.understandingwar.org/report/army-all-corners-assads-campaign-strategy-syria" target="_blank">“An Army in All Corners”: Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria</a> </i><i><i><span style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;">by ISW Syria Analyst <a href="http://www.understandingwar.org/press-media/staff-bios/christopher-kozak" target="_blank">Christopher Kozak</a> published in April 2015. </span></i></i></div>
<i>
</i>
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<i><span style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;">__________</span></i><i></i></div>
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;">June 24th Update: As the Syrian Civil War moves into its fifth year, the Assad regime appears increasingly incapable of mounting successful large-scale offensive maneuvers capable of securing and holding territory amidst a string of recent ISIS, JN, and Syrian opposition advances. Unconfirmed reports over the past twenty-four hours indicate that Syrian rebels may now be preparing for a major offensive to seize Dera’a City in southern Syria in preparation for a potential drive on Damascus. The excerpt below details the regime’s military operations in Damascus and its environs through late 2014 and into 2015 in order to provide context regarding the military priorities and capabilities of the Assad regime in southern Syria. ISW will release a publication next week detailing recent developments in the south and their implications for the Syrian Civil War.</b></div>
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">
</span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Taken as a whole, Assad’s military campaign has largely succeeded only in generating further disorder. The strategy of defensive protraction adopted by the Assad regime resulted in a grueling and destructive stalemate across most of the battlefields of Syria through 2014 and into 2015. Limited manpower and resupply options constrained the offensive capabilities of pro-regime forces, forcing Assad to prioritize a small number of fronts while maintaining a reactive stance throughout the remainder of the country. This force posture has entrenched a state of persistent conflict in Syria which exacerbated humanitarian ailments, deepened polarization among the populace, and provided space for jihadist forces to expand their social and military control relatively unchecked. An increasing reliance on paramilitary and Iranian proxy forces along the most critical frontlines in Aleppo, Damascus, and the Alawite heartland failed to secure decisive victories against opposition forces and fueled sectarian narratives of conflict promulgated by extremist actors. An examination of the frontlines in Aleppo, Damascus, and central Syria where Assad chose to go on the offensive demonstrates how Assad balanced his available resources in order to achieve some battlefield success while preserving the ongoing stalemate across the country.</span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br />
<b><span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Aleppo</span></b><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">One of the keys to Assad’s military strategy has been the campaign for Aleppo, a major commercial capital in northern Syria and Syria’s second-largest city. A continuous military presence in the city is essential to Assad’s claim to control all of Syria, though rebels have contested the city since 2012. Full control of Aleppo would strengthen the negotiating position of the regime in any future political settlement. It holds equal value to the opposition. The frontlines between regime and rebel forces within Aleppo city proper have remained relatively static for over two years as both sides lack the necessary manpower and equipment to clear and hold the dense urban terrain of the city. The regime decided to lay siege to rebel positions in the city in late 2013, shifting the relevant battlespace to the rural outskirts of the city where the regime’s superiority in armor and air assets could be maximized in support of offensive maneuver operations largely unseen in the rest of Syria. This ‘siege-and-starve’ strategy also followed the model of similar sieges by the regime throughout the country, most notably in Homs city and the suburbs of Damascus.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">The regime began the first phase of its encirclement campaign by seizing the heavily defended urban terrain of the Sheikh Najjar Industrial City northeast of Aleppo on July 5, 2014. The advance by the regime took advantage of advances made by ISIS north of Aleppo city which threatened rebel supply lines crossing into Turkey and spurred confusion among opposition ranks. Regime forces augmented by a range of pro-regime irregulars launched a second phase of advance and seized the villages of Handarat north of Aleppo city on October 3, 2014, in a direct threat to the only major rebel supply line into Aleppo city, the Castello Road. This same coalition of pro-regime forces entered the al-Mallah farmlands west of Handarat village on December 14, 2014. The growing delays between these advances, as well as an increasing reliance on Iranian proxy fighters staging through the Nayrab Airbase, suggested that the year-long operation to encircle Aleppo had come under increasing stress by late 2014.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">In a sign of the pressures placed upon pro-regime forces, the regime encirclement of Aleppo suffered its first significant setback in February 2015. On February 17, 2015, regime forces supported by fresh NDF, Hezbollah, and Shi’a Afghan reinforcements seized large portions of the villages of Bashkuy, Rityan, Duwayr al-Zeitun, and Hardatnin north of Aleppo following a rapid westward advance. The regime likely sought to break the siege of the Shi’a-majority towns of Nubl and Zahraa northwest of Aleppo, linking their forces in an arc of control dominating almost all opposition supply lines in the northern countryside of Aleppo. However, the scale and speed of the advance apparently overextended regime forces, leaving their positions vulnerable to rebel counterattack. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Rebel forces recaptured the villages north of Aleppo within four days after clashes which killed over 150 pro-regime fighters. JN, Jabhat Ansar al-Din, and other allied Salafi-jihadist groups also captured the al-Mallah farmlands on February 20, 2015 and portions of Handarat village on March 10, reducing regime gains to the October 2014 status quo. This reversal demonstrated the difficulties that the regime faces in completing the encirclement of Aleppo while operating at the end of an extended supply line. However, despite these setbacks, regime forces still pose a dire threat to opposition-held Aleppo. Aleppo is a key northern “pin” on the map of Syria and Assad remains unlikely to abandon his campaign for any reason. The arrival of further regime reinforcements or an escalation of rebel infighting in Aleppo could enable the regime to complete the encirclement of the city. The end result of this operation would be a protracted siege of Aleppo which subjects the rebel-held districts of Syria’s commercial capital to starvation and punishing aerial bombardment in a powerful symbolic and strategic blow to the Syrian opposition. </span><br />
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
<b style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;">Securing Damascus</b></div>
</div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
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</div>
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</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">The elimination of the opposition threat to the Syrian capital of Damascus formed the second core component of the Assad regime’s military strategy. Durable control over the formal seat of government and the home of several million Syrian citizens provides the Syrian regime with a solid claim to domestic and international legitimacy. Damascus is also key terrain from a military perspective due to the high number of airbases, military installations, and elite SAA units present in the vicinity of the city. Damascus also serves as a key transit route for shipments of Iranian weapons and equipment to Lebanese Hezbollah and other proxy forces via the Damascus International Airport. Rebel forces began actively contesting the capital in early 2012 and currently hold large swathes of the eastern and southern suburbs of the city.</span><br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><img src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-mZOR7faQ_f8/VV3ucbtCQ3I/AAAAAAAADWc/HmvuymPaSX8/s1600/Damascus-Sector-Map_CEASEFIRES_2015.png" /></span></div>
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;">The regime’s campaign for Damascus can be broken into two distinct lines of effort. The first primary focus is the battle to reduce and eventually eliminate the strong rebel pocket in the Eastern Ghouta suburbs, a mixed rural-urban region which holds an estimated 160,000 civilians and opposition fighters.167 Eastern Ghouta has been the scene of some of the fiercest urban fighting in the capital, including the August 21, 2013 chemical weapons attacks targeting several opposition-held districts in the area. Meanwhile, the regime has also conducted a systematic effort to neutralize other opposition-held neighborhoods through sieges, starvation, and ceasefire agreements, preserving its combat power for other battlefronts. Assad has heavily relied upon his elite ‘praetorian guard’ units – including the Republican Guard and the 4th Armored Division – as well as Iranian proxy forces in order to prosecute his campaign in Damascus. Regime forces concentrated their offensive capacities against Eastern Ghouta in an attempt to neutralize and compress the largest pocket of opposition fighters in the capital. In contrast, the Assad regime utilized siege-and-starve tactics to neutralize rebel forces in the denser urban terrain of southern Damascus with minimal military effort.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>Eastern Ghouta</b></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">The regime directed its main efforts in early 2014 towards driving rebel forces from Jobar and Mleiha, two districts of eastern Damascus which formed part of the western defensive line for opposition-held Eastern Ghouta. Jobar represented the furthest line of opposition advance into Damascus city proper and its heavily-developed urban environment provided rebel forces with a decisive advantage which the assaulting forces of the elite SAA 105th Brigade Republican Guard were unable to overcome. Regime forces targeted Jobar with heavy artillery, airstrikes, and ballistic missiles on a daily basis, while both rebel and regime fighters have constructed complex networks of tunnels used to facilitate troop movement and ferry food and other supplies. In some cases, both sides have used ‘tunnel bomb’ attacks to burrow explosives underneath opposing strongholds. Under these conditions, the situation in Jobar remains a virtual stalemate as of April 2015. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Forces from the elite SAA 4th Armored Division supported by NDF, Iraqi Shi’a fighters, and Hezbollah launched an offensive against Mleiha on April 3, 2014. Although the town was subjected to a constant barrage of airstrikes and ballistic missiles, regime ground troops proved unable to make significant initial gains. By the end of May 2014, pro-opposition media claimed that the clashes in Mleiha had killed over eight hundred pro-regime fighters. The withdrawal of Iraqi Shi’a militias from Syria following the fall of Mosul in June 2014 slowed the regime’s push for Mleiha. Activist sources reported that the majority of Iraqi fighters along the Mleiha front had departed by June 19, 2014, forcing the regime to ease its assault on the area. However, the mobilization and deployment of over 1,000 Hezbollah fighters to Damascus in order to “defend the Sayyida Zeinab shrine” quickly revitalized the regime’s offensive. On July 12, 2014, SAA supported by NDF and Hezbollah advanced around the eastern perimeter of Mleiha, placing the town and several hundred opposition fighters under siege. Although JN fighters used an SVBIED attack to successfully break the siege on August 3, 2014, pro-regime forces reestablished the cordon one week later. “The regime forces now wrap around the perimeter of the town,” the opposition Mleiha Local Council reported. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Under siege and faced with punishing bombardment from the air, rebel fighters withdrew from Mleiha on August 14, 2014 in a major victory for regime and Hezbollah forces. An activist asserted that “the loss of Mleiha is considered as important as the loss of the Qalamoun” region along the Lebanese border to a similar joint regime-Hezbollah operation in early 2014.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Regime forces capitalized on momentum gained from the capture of Mleiha as well as the arrival of reinforcements drawn from the nearby Qalamoun region to secure several additional victories against the Syrian opposition in Eastern Ghouta. SAA and NDF forces seized the village of Adra and the adjacent Adra Industrial City after a series of clashes from September 25 to 27, 2014, restricting rebel freedom of movement towards the Qalamoun region to the northeast. Meanwhile, Republican Guard units and rebel forces traded possession of the Dukhaniyah suburb located northwest of Mleiha multiple times in September 2014 in heavy clashes which included several alleged chlorine gas attacks before regime fighters finally secured the district on October 6, 2014. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">The Assad regime next turned its attention towards the town of Douma, a major rebel stronghold in the Eastern Ghouta suburbs dominated by prominent Islamist faction Jaysh al- Islam. On November 6, 2014, SAA forces seized the Wafidin Camp north of Douma, severing the last remaining opposition supply line into Eastern Ghouta. Over subsequent months, the Syrian Air Force sharply intensified its bombardment of Douma and other towns in Eastern Ghouta, causing hundreds of casualties. Mosques in Eastern Ghouta began cancelling Friday prayers in order to avoid presenting tempting targets to regime pilots. The severity of these airstrikes prompted Jaysh al-Islam to announce a retaliatory campaign of rocket attacks targeting Damascus city in late January to early February 2015 in a move publically portrayed as an attempt to deter further regime bombardment. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">The Assad regime leveraged illegal tactics of collective punishment in order to encourage the depopulation of rebel-held areas. On November 24, 2014, regime forces opened the Wafidin Camp crossing to permit “dozens” of families to flee Eastern Ghouta. In late January 2015, Syrian state media claimed regime forces evacuated over 2,000 additional civilians from the area. On March 19, 2015, opposition sources reported that another 1,000 civilians were allowed to flee Eastern Ghouta via a checkpoint in Harasta. These mass evacuations served a clear propaganda purpose by highlighting the cleavages between rebel forces and the populace under their control. The policy of evacuations also fuels suspicions and infighting amongst rebel forces in Eastern Ghouta regarding potential reconciliation agreements with the regime. Overall, however, the regime campaign against Eastern Ghouta appears to have stalled amidst a shift in regime focus towards countering rebel gains in Dera’a and Quneitra Provinces to the south. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>Siege-and-Starve</b></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">The Assad regime has relied on a system of sieges to force the submission of opposition-held neighborhoods throughout Damascus without diverting valuable combat resources from Eastern Ghouta. Regime forces also employ these blockades to depopulate rebel-held terrain, draining the pool of opposition support while bolstering the legitimacy of the Syrian government. One internal UN World Food Program document implicitly acknowledging that civilians can only receive food if they relocate to regime-held areas. The widespread use of deliberate starvation as a tool of war prompted the UN Security Council to pass UNSC Resolution 2139 on February 22, 2014, underscoring that “starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited by international humanitarian law” and demanding that “all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, promptly allow rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access” to all areas of Syria. Despite this rebuke, the Assad regime has continued its siege-and-starve campaign in southern Damascus unabated through 2014 and into 2015, particularly in the southwestern suburb of Darayya and the Yarmouk Camp district of Damascus. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">The Assad regime has utilized the siege-and-starve strategy to coerce several opposition-held neighborhoods of Damascus into ceasefire and ‘normalization’ agreements. These deals serve to deescalate scattered fronts throughout Damascus, enabling the regime to redirect its limited military resources towards high-priority areas such as Eastern Ghouta. The ceasefires also provide the Assad regime with a narrative of “national reconciliation” which bolsters its claim to political legitimacy by demonstrating a willingness to forge peace. President Assad has consistently underlined in interviews that ceasefire agreements are “something concrete” which provide a “measure of confidence” for a political settlement. On February 5, 2015, he established a high committee on reconciliation staffed by five cabinet ministers, three provincial governors, and the head of the National Security Bureau. These reconciliation agreements provoke distrust on the ground, however, from both the opposition and the regime. An opposition activist in a Damascus neighborhood under one such agreement expressed this sentiment stating that “this isn’t a reconciliation…this is a ceasefire until circumstances play in the revolution’s favor.” Meanwhile, an anonymous official in the regime Ministry of Reconciliation Affairs noted: “We have reservations; we do not see it as reconciliation, just a cessation of hostilities as weapons remain with both sides.” </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">The examination of one prominent Damascus ceasefire deal provides a reflection of these tensions. The southwestern Damascus suburb of Moadamiyah concluded a local ceasefire agreement with regime forces in December 2013 after a punishing siege. The ceasefire was promoted as a sign of ongoing “national reconciliation;” however, the Assad regime delayed in meeting its obligations and only partially lifted its siege. Reflecting upon the ceasefire agreement over a year later in February 2015, an activist from Moadamiyah wrote in the Washington Times: “The regime continues to cut off power, gas and other basic services to Moadamiyah. Some humanitarian aid is allowed to enter, but not nearly enough for the town’s residents…Most egregiously, bombardments continue and the regime has resumed arrest raids on civilians.” Read the full report for accounts of a similar ceasefire agreement in the southern Damascus neighborhoods of Yalda, Babbila, and Beit Sahem in February 2014.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>Qalamoun</b></span></div>
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</div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">The Assad regime sought to clear and hold the Qalamoun Mountains, a strategic region northeast of the capital running along the Lebanese border, in order to defend the northern approaches to the capital and maintain access to the M5 Highway connecting Damascus to Homs, Hama, and the Syrian coast. The establishment of a strong regime presence along the border region also served to sever cross-border rebel supply lines based out of eastern Lebanon. Thus, regime forces launched a major operation to clear the Qalamoun on November 15, 2013. The timing of this offensive coincided with the end of major regime combat operations to clear the supply line to Aleppo city in an indication of the military advantage enjoyed by the Assad regime in late 2013. Lebanese Hezbollah fighters played a key role in the offensive, providing strained and inadequately equipped regime units with large amounts of manpower skilled in mountain warfare.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;"><br />Regime forces supported by Hezbollah and the NDF rapidly advanced south along the M5 Highway towards Damascus, seizing a string of rebel-held towns including Deir Attiyah in late November 2013, an-Nabek in mid-December 2013, and the opposition stronghold of Yabroud on March 16, 2014. (Read “</span><a href="http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fall-yabroud-and-campaign-lebanese-border" style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;" target="_blank">The Fall of Yabroud and the Campaign for the Lebanese Border</a><span style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;">” by ISW Analyst Isabel Nassief.) As thousands of rebel fighters fled into Lebanon or further southwest towards Damascus, the regime offensive continued to move along the Lebanese border. Rebel and Hezbollah sources indicated that Hezbollah fighters led most of the ground offensives in the Qalamoun while the SAA restricted itself to providing air and artillery support. This deep reliance on foreign proxy forces to achieve battlefield success illustrated the declining agency of the Assad regime on the battlefield.</span></div>
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<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/--SSfD0TokQo/VV3udX_j6CI/AAAAAAAADWk/0bOv5c9KQzE/s1600/Qalamoun-Map.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/--SSfD0TokQo/VV3udX_j6CI/AAAAAAAADWk/0bOv5c9KQzE/s1600/Qalamoun-Map.png" /></a></div>
<div>
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Regime and Hezbollah forces proved unable to clear rebel presence from the rural regions of the border despite holding most urban centers in the Qalamoun and maintaining unrestricted use of the M5 Highway. One Hezbollah fighter noted in an interview the difficulties in securing the rugged terrain of the region, stating that “It’s impossible for us to control all the mountains along the border, but we have enough people to do reconnaissance and ambushes.” These limitations forced Hezbollah and regime forces to man static defensive positions in unfriendly terrain, leaving their fighters vulnerable to attack. Rebel forces exploited the disruption caused by the withdrawal of Iraqi Shi’a militiamen from Syria in mid-June 2014 to launch a wave of deadly raids against Hezbollah and NDF checkpoints located on the outskirts of Rankous, Asal al-Ward, Hawsh al-Arab, Ras Ma’ara, Deir Attiyah, and Yabroud. Meanwhile, Hezbollah and NDF fighters continued to bear an increasing share of the combat burden in the northern Qalamoun as the Syrian regime redeployed its regular SAA units in the area to reinforce frontlines in Damascus city and Zabadani in the southern Qalamoun. This pressure sparked open clashes on several instances between Hezbollah fighters and local NDF militiamen rooted in accusations that Syrian forces rarely participate in fighting, leaving their Hezbollah partners unsupported.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Primary regime efforts in Qalamoun shifted in the summer of 2014 to the town of Zabadani located northwest of Damascus near the Jdaydet Yabous border crossing, a primary supply route used by Lebanese Hezbollah to transport fighters and weapons between Syria and Lebanon. The Assad regime first focused on isolating Zabadani from rebel reinforcement and resupply. Regime forces established a cordon around Zabadani and subjected the town to heavy shelling with artillery and barrel bombs throughout the summer and fall of 2014. However, in late December 2014 Ahrar al-Sham, JN, and other opposition forces launched an offensive which seized several checkpoints and military installations northwest of Zabadani, loosening the regime siege over the area and threatening Jdaydet Yabous. Clashes to reassert the cordon around Zabadani are still ongoing as of April 2015 with regime forces unable to secure a decisive advantage. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>Deraa/Quneitra</b></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Dera’a and Quneitra Provinces in southern Syria formed a major source of opposition strength which directly threatened the southern approaches to Damascus. Nonetheless, regime forces in the two provinces operated in a relatively passive defensive stance throughout 2014, appearing content to slowly trade territory in the heavily-militarized region in order to devote limited reinforcements to other fronts. SAA units based in Dera’a and Quneitra Provinces were rarely reinforced, while pervasive anti-regime sentiment among the local population resulted in low NDF recruitment. Most SAA formations in southern Syria remained in close vicinity to their bases despite the spread of the Syrian civil war due to both pragmatic concerns over the political reliability of conscript soldiers as well as strategic concerns regarding the fears of an Israeli incursion. The Assad regime also likely remained confident that opposition forces could not breach the Damascus ‘military zone,’ a belt of strongpoints and army facilities south of the city originally designed to shield the capital against an Israeli armored thrust from the Golan Heights. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Increasing rebel unification and a series of successful opposition offensives in summer and fall 2014 increasingly challenged the regime disposition in southern Syria. Rebel fighters had seized a series of hills and military facilities in southern Quneitra Province by May of 2014, enabling opposition forces to form a continuous zone of control along the Jordanian border. Rebel momentum continued unabated, despite asymmetric response by the Syrian regime including large numbers of barrel bomb attacks, air raids, and heavy artillery shelling. JN, Ahrar al-Sham, and the FSA-affiliated Southern Front seized the Quneitra border crossing with the Golan Heights on August 28, 2014, as well as Tel al-Hara, the location of a joint Russian-Syrian signals intelligence facility on October 5, 2014. JN and other rebel forces later seized complete control over the town of Sheikh Miskin on January 25, 2015 despite the reinforcement of regime units by Hezbollah fighters and IRGC officers, threatening the regime’s supply line to isolated forces in Dera’a city. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">This rapid succession of rebel gains threatened to bring Syrian opposition forces to the southern gates of Damascus city, forcing the regime to re-evaluate its strategy. Regime forces responded by launching an offensive against rebel positions in northwestern Dera’a Province on February 9, 2015 with support from at least forty tanks of the elite 4th Armored Division. Iran reportedly played a key role in the planning, organization, and execution of the offensive, with activists claiming that a large proportion of involved ground forces were composed of fighters from Lebanese Hezbollah, Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas, and the ‘Fatimiyoun’ Iranian-Afghani Shi’a militia. </span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Multiple sources claimed that overall leadership for the operation was provided by ‘Iranian commanders’ with Syrian officers being transferred away from the front or executed for alleged collaboration with rebel forces. In support of this claim, IRGC Quds Force commander Qassem Suleimani reportedly made a public appearance along the frontlines on February 11, 2015. In another notable indicator, this offensive followed the aforementioned Israeli airstrike in the al-Amal Farms area of Quneitra Province on January 18, 2015 which killed several prominent Hezbollah commanders, including Jihad Mughniyeh, as well as IRGC ground forces commander General Mohammad Ali Allahdadi. This delegation of senior Hezbollah and IRGC figures was likely conducting final preparations for the upcoming offensive. The degree of Iranian leadership and coordination witnessed in this offensive was unprecedented and signalled a willingness by Iran to adopt a more overt posture in Syria in order to protect its interests in the country. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Within days, the pro-regime coalition made significant gains – seizing the rebel-held towns of Deir al-Adas, Deir Makir, and al-Danajah in northwestern Dera’a Province while threatening the towns of Kafr Nasij, Kafr Shams, and Masharah. Rebel commanders stated that pro-regime forces employed a number of unfamiliar tactics which initially overwhelmed opposition units once again underscoring the notion that Iran and its proxy forces took lead over the SAA and regime military commanders in this offensive.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">The trajectory of pro-regime forces indicated that they likely intended to recapture the strategic heights at Tel al-Hara, reestablishing dominance over a large swath of the Dera’a Plain. However, despite declarations by opposition defense minister Maj. Gen. Salim Idriss that “the balance of power is in favor of the Iranian militias” in southern Syria, regime advances slowed in the face of several counteroffensives and the arrival of large numbers of rebel reinforcements to the area. Opposition groups continued to gain ground against the regime in other parts of the province despite being placed on the defensive in northwestern Dera’a Province. Rebel forces seized the town of Busra al-Sham along the border with Suwayda Province on March 25, 2015 and the Nasib border crossing with Jordan six days later. These victories underscore the limitations of Assad’s military forces even when augmented by Iranian proxies and advisors.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><b>________</b></span></div>
Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-58784282737137072722015-06-19T11:24:00.000-07:002015-06-19T11:24:16.016-07:00Control in Syria: June 19, 2015<div style="text-align: center;">
<i>by: ISW Syria Team</i></div>
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<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-2NAzSJCLWRo/VYRd844kx4I/AAAAAAAADkc/nqR-3rAk4KA/s1600/Syria-Control-Map-18-JUN-15_HIGH.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-2NAzSJCLWRo/VYRd844kx4I/AAAAAAAADkc/nqR-3rAk4KA/s1600/Syria-Control-Map-18-JUN-15_HIGH.png" /></a></div>
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Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-40773737132329657252015-06-19T11:04:00.002-07:002015-06-19T11:04:27.110-07:00ISIS Sanctuary: June 19, 2015<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-j2Ew4ppzs2I/VYRZpi5LpDI/AAAAAAAADj8/I-FkmoxhKR4/s1600/ISIS-Sanctuary_061915_HIGH.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-j2Ew4ppzs2I/VYRZpi5LpDI/AAAAAAAADj8/I-FkmoxhKR4/s1600/ISIS-Sanctuary_061915_HIGH.png" /></a></div>
<br />Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-26973115510483278682015-06-17T12:49:00.000-07:002015-06-17T13:01:53.035-07:00 The YPG Campaign for Tel Abyad and Northern ar-Raqqa Province<div style="text-align: center;">
<i>by: Christopher Kozak and Genevieve Casagrande</i></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<i><br /></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<b><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Key
Takeaway:</span></i></b><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> YPG forces supported by
FSA-affiliated rebel forces and U.S.-led coalition airstrikes seized the
ISIS-held border crossing of Tel Abyad in northern ar-Raqqa Province on June 15,
2015, in a major victory for Syrian Kurds and the international anti-ISIS
coalition. These gains successfully connect the Kurdish cantons of Kobani and Hasakah
into one contiguous zone of YPG control along the Turkish border and optimally
positioned joint YPG-FSA forces for an eventual advance south towards the ISIS stronghold
of ar-Raqqa City. Kurdish forces cooperated with a coalition of Arab tribes,
Assyrian paramilitary forces, and FSA-affiliated rebel factions to enable its
rapid advance, although sustained accusations of ‘ethnic cleansing’ by the YPG of
Arab civilians may disrupt wider coordination with the Syrian opposition.
Recent YPG gains will also likely exacerbate tensions between Syrian Kurds, the
Turkish government, and the Assad regime in a way which limits the options
available to both the YPG and the U.S. in the fight against ISIS in northern
and eastern Syria.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Syrian
Kurdish YPG forces supported by FSA-affiliated rebel forces and U.S.-led
international coalition airstrikes </span><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/15/us-mideast-crisis-idUSKBN0OV2KE20150615?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">seized</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> the ISIS-held border town of Tel
Abyad in northern ar-Raqqa Province on June 15, 2015. This victory marks the
culmination of a new YPG-led campaign to reverse ISIS’s gains against the three
Kurdish cantons of northern Syria, including Hasakah, Kobani, and Afrin; to
limit the flow of direct ISIS reinforcement through the Tel Abyad border
crossing to ar-Raqqa City and eastern Syria; and to establish a contiguous
Kurdish region stretching from Kobani to Hasakah Province. Tel Abyad is a
border town on the Syrian-Turkish border between two Kurdish areas, Hasakah and
Kobani that lies immediately north of ISIS-held Raqqa city. Tel Abyad and its
surrounding villages represented a pocket of ISIS-held terrain which blocked
transit between the Hasakah and Kobani cantons and simultaneously provided ISIS
with direct supply lines for reinforcement and resupply between the Turkish
border and the self-declared ISIS capital city of ar-Raqqa. Although ISIS
steadily lost ground to joint Kurdish and rebel forces in eastern Aleppo
Province in the immediate aftermath of the failure of its Kobani offensive in
March 2015, ISIS forces managed to establish relatively stable defensive lines
to protect Tel Abyad from the west. ISIS even achieved limited gains in Hasakah
Province to the east, where Kurdish and regime forces maintain an informal
alliance to cooperate in securing the province against ISIS advances. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">The
new YPG operation, </span><a href="http://ypgrojava.com/en/index.php/statements/674-operation-commander-rubar-qamishlo-beginning-of-phase-two"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">announced</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> on May 6 under the name <i>Operation Martyr Rubar Qamishlo</i> after a
fallen YPG commander who died fighting ISIS, sought to reverse this dynamic and
roll back the remaining ISIS presence in northern Syria. The operation began in
Hasakah Province with a YPG push </span><a href="http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2015/May-20/298671-kurds-advance-against-isis-in-northeastern-syria.ashx"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">south</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> from the Turkish border crossing at
Ras al-Ayn east of Tel Abyad, directed tosecure numerous villages recently
threatened by ISIS, including the crossroads town of Tel Tamir, the Assyrian
villages of the Khabour River Valley, and the entirety of the </span><a href="https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/565313-kurds-rolling-back-isis-in-hasakeh"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Abdul Aziz</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> mountain range west of Hasakah
City. The YPG conducted this phase of the operation with the assistance of
local Assyrian militia formations. Once the YPG had secured the western flank
of Hasakah Province, YPG forces began the advance west towards Tel Abyad and </span><a href="https://twitter.com/PolatCanRojava/status/603204188701491201"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">seized</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> the town of Mabrouka southwest of
Ras al-Ayn on May 26 after </span><a href="https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/565335-syria-kurds-get-greenlight-for-ambitious-campaign"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">receiving</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> a “green light” from the U.S.-led
air coalition to seize the entirely of the Kobani – Hasakah road along the
Turkish border. This decision signaled U.S. support for some form of contiguous
Kurdish autonomous region in northern Syria despite continuing Turkish
reservations regarding the expansion of YPG influence on its southern border.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<div style="text-align: center;">
</div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">In
response, ISIS launched an </span><a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/isil-launches-offensive-syria-hasakeh-150530134454150.html"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">offensive</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> against regime positions south of Hasakah
City on May 30 in an apparent attempt to divert Kurdish resources and disrupt
the ongoing YPG offensive. However, ISIS’s effort failed to draw significant
numbers of Kurdish fighters towards Hasakah City, and YPG forces supported by
FSA-affiliated rebels subsequently seized dozens of villages </span><a href="http://www.shaam.org/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A9.html"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">west</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> and </span><a href="http://www.all4syria.info/Archive/219014"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">east</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> of Tel Abyad in a consolidated
effort to envelope the border city. These advances culminated in the </span><a href="http://www.syriahr.com/en/2015/06/is-pulls-back-from-the-town-of-salouk-and-ypg-backed-by-rebels-advance-in-it/"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">seizure</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> of the town of Suluk 20 kilometers
southeast of Tel Abyad on June 14. The
next day, YPG and FSA forces penetrated Tel Abyad from the </span><a href="http://www.syriahr.com/en/2015/06/ypg-backed-by-rebels-and-u-s-led-coalition-airstrikes-advance-and-take-control-on-a-new-area-in-tal-abiad-countryside/"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">southeast</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> and quickly overwhelmed the small,
unreinforced ISIS force that remained in the town, prompting them to surrender
to Turkish forces at the border or flee south towards Ayn Issa and ar-Raqqa
City. YPG and rebel commanders have since </span><a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/kurdish-fighters-allied-rebels-rout-islamic-state-from-syrian-border-town-of-tal-abyad-1434465828"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">messaged</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> that the next phase of anti-ISIS operations
will involve a joint YPG-FSA offensive south from Tel Abyad to seize Ayn Issa,
sever interior ISIS lines of communication, and threaten ar-Raqqa City. This
operation could potentially enable anti-ISIS forces to penetrate into ISIS’s
core stronghold in Syria in a development which may produce positive
ramifications for other anti-ISIS operations across Iraq and Syria.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-qm8mN9-34R8/VYHN16v_geI/AAAAAAAADjQ/iTReKkyhRNQ/s1600/Tel%2BAbyad%2BMap-01%2BFINAL.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-qm8mN9-34R8/VYHN16v_geI/AAAAAAAADjQ/iTReKkyhRNQ/s1600/Tel%2BAbyad%2BMap-01%2BFINAL.png" /></a><i style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Who is Involved?</span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">The
YPG </span><a href="http://www.syriahr.com/en/2015/05/ypg-backed-by-al-khabour-guards-forces-al-sanadid-army-and-the-syriac-military-council-expels-is-out-of-more-than-230-towns-villages-and-farmlands/"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">leveraged</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> a coalition of allied forces in
order to buttress its offensives in northern Syria and promote its
inclusiveness to non-Kurdish populations in the region. In Hasakah Province to
the east, YPG forces resisting ISIS’s advances in Tel Tamir and the </span><a href="http://mideasti.blogspot.com/2015/03/the-assyrian-christians-on-syrias.html"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">majority-Assyrian</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> villages along the Khabour River
Valley received assistance from a number of Assyrian </span><a href="http://www.thenational.ae/arts-culture/instead-of-fleeing-some-of-syrias-christians-will-stand-their-ground#full"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">paramilitary</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> formations, including local
residents enrolled in the ‘</span><a href="http://ninevehnews.com/?p=304"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Khabour Guards</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">’ as well as fighters from the
greater </span><a href="https://twitter.com/SyriacMFS/status/605097239309127680"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Syriac Military Council</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> (MFS). YPG units in Hasakah
Province also cooperated closely with Jaysh al-Sanadid, an Arab tribal militia </span><a href="http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/21067"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">commanded</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> by Sheikh Hamidi Daham al-Hadi of
the </span><a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=55607"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">historically</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> pro-Kurdish Shammar tribe of
northeastern Syria and northwestern Iraq. Although these groups remain driven
largely by local concerns and have not played noticeable roles in the YPG
offensive on Tel Abyad, their presence enables the YPG to deploy manpower
towards offensive action without compromising security in its rear areas.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">In
Kobani canton to the west of Tel Abyad, the YPG operates alongside a number of
FSA-aligned Syrian rebel factions organized under the umbrella of the Burkan
al-Firat (Euphrates Volcano) Operations Room. The Euphrates Volcano Operations
Room was </span><a href="http://iswsyria.blogspot.com/2014/09/ypg-and-rebel-forces-challenge-isis-in.html"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">founded</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> on September 10, 2014, with the
expressed </span><a href="http://aranews.net/2014/09/ypg-fsa-form-joint-military-chamber-combat-isis-syria/"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">intent</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> of expelling ISIS from eastern
Aleppo and ar-Raqqa Provinces. The majority of the groups participating in the
operations room consist of </span><a href="http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/factions-kobani-ayn-al-arab/"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">local brigades</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> seeking to reclaim their home
regions following losses to ISIS which forced them to seek shelter in
Kurdish-held areas. The presence of these rebel fighters thus provides YPG
forces with added legitimacy in their efforts to seize and administer Tel Abyad
and the surrounding villages of northern ar-Raqqa Province, which are populated
</span><a href="http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Syria_Ethnic_Detailed_lg.png"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">primarily</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> by Arab and Turkmen civilians
sympathetic to ISIS. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Ethnic Cleansing?<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Despite
its inclusion of FSA-affiliated rebel factions and other local paramilitary
forces, prominent opposition actors have accused YPG forces of perpetrating a
number of abuses against Arab civilians during the advance into northern ar-Raqqa
Province. These allegations largely center upon claimed YPG involvement in the
forced displacement of Arab civilians and the burning of Arab homes in an
“ethnic cleansing” campaign designed to lay the foundation for the
establishment of an autonomous Kurdish region in northern Syria. On May 30, as
YPG forces began the advance towards Tel Abyad, the exiled Syrian National
Coalition (SNC) released a </span><a href="http://en.etilaf.org/press/syrian-coalition-warns-the-pyd-and-condemns-its-crimes.html"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">statement</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> accusing the YPG of committing
“violations” against the local civilian population in Hasakah Province which
served to “encourage sectarian and ethnic extremism.” In early June, Syrian
opposition figures reaffirmed their concern over reports of YPG civilian abuses
against Arab and Turkmen populations in light of the imminent fall of Tel
Abyad. Former Syrian Military Council (SMC) chief of staff Salim Idriss </span><a href="http://www.shaam.org/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A5%D8%AF%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%91%D8%A8%D8%B9-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7.html"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">stated</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> his concern regarding Kurdish
abuses against civilians, while Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, and thirteen
other prominent rebel brigades released a </span><a href="https://twitter.com/sham_front/status/610366410657824768"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">joint statement</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> demanding that the YPG be listed
as a “terrorist organization” due to its “ethnic cleansing” of Arab areas.
Independent media organizations have also </span><a href="http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2015/06/13/269821/ethnic-cleansing-charged-as-kurds.html"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">reported</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> these allegations, although no
clear evidence has yet been presented. These accusations may threaten to
disrupt the current cooperation between Kurdish forces and the Syrian
opposition amidst preparations for a FSA-led offensive towards ar-Raqqa City. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Implications <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">The
YPG capture of Tel Abyad marks a major strategic victory for Kurdish forces and
their efforts to form the governance structures of a self-declared Kurdish autonomous
region in northern Syria termed ‘Rojava.’ Kurdish control over Tel Abyad and
its countryside </span><a href="http://ypgrojava.com/en/index.php/news/718-pictures-two-sides-of-resistance-first-merged-together-june-16-2015"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">provided</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> a physical link between the Cizire
(Hasakah) and Kobani (Ayn al-Arab) cantons for the first time, </span><a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33146515"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">bolstering</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> the YPG’s value to the
international anti-ISIS coalition as well as Kurdish claims to self-governance.
However, these gains also escalate tensions with two prominent actors: Turkey
and the Assad regime. The Turkish government has repeatedly </span><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/11/us-syria-crisis-turkey-erdogan-idUSKBN0OR11620150611"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">condemned</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> the YPG as a “terrorist” group due
to its </span><a href="http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/09/23/350579007/why-does-the-u-s-like-the-kurds-in-iraq-but-not-in-syria"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">connections</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> with the outlawed Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK), and Turkish President Recep Erdogan </span><a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20150614-erdogan-says-troubled-kurdish-advance-northern-syria?ns_campaign=reseaux_sociaux&ns_source=twitter&ns_mchannel=social&ns_linkname=editorial&aef_campaign_ref=partage_aef&aef_campaign_date=2015-06-14&dlvrit=65413"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">warned</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> on June 14 that the YPG seizure of
Tel Abyad “could lead to the creation of a structure [i.e. Rojava] that
threatens our borders”. These concerns could ultimately drive the Turkish
government to curtail or otherwise limit its participation in the international
anti-ISIS coalition.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Meanwhile,
the Assad regime maintains an </span><a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=58814"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">uneasy balance</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> with YPG forces in Hasakah
Province, particularly in the cities of Hasakah and Qamishli, and remains
unwilling to allow a Kurdish separation from Syria. Similarly, Syrian Kurds
harbor no sympathy for the Assad regime following years of systemic </span><a href="http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syria1109web_0.pdf"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">repression</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> and the removal of the remaining
regime presence in Hasakah Province forms a necessary precondition for the
formation of a truly autonomous Rojava, Although regime and YPG forces continue
to informally cooperate in Hasakah Province, this engrained antipathy has
resulted in numerous minor clashes between regime and YPG forces in
northeastern Syria. In one recent </span><a href="http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/234921"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">incident</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">, YPG forces refused to provide
support to regime forces during an early June 2015 ISIS offensive against
regime positions south of Hasakah City, prompting the state-owned <i>Al-Watan</i> newspaper to publish a critique
of the “American project” to establish an independent Kurdish entity. One day
after the fall of Tel Abyad, YPG and regime forces </span><a href="https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/565441-kurds-take-on-syria-regime-in-qamishli"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">engaged</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> in clashes throughout Qamishli
which the YPG blamed on regime “provocations”. These tensions will likely
intensify as the YPG continues to gain ground in northern Syria and the regime
suffers additional losses in western Syria. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">The
YPG and its local allies retain an optimal position to threaten ISIS control
over ar-Raqqa City and its surrounding countryside in the aftermath of the
battle for Tel Abyad. Rebel fighters in the Euphrates Volcano Operations Room
have </span><a href="http://syriadirect.org/news/fsa-fighter-after-tel-abyad-onwards-to-a-raqqa/"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">identified</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> ar-Raqqa City as their next
objective and the YPG defense chief for Kobani canton </span><a href="http://www.welati.info/nuce.php?ziman=ar&id=23301&niviskar=1&cure=3&kijan="><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">confirmed</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> that “Tel Abyad is only the end of
a phase…we will pursue what remains of ISIS, no matter where.” ISIS appears to
view a joint YPG-rebel advance on ar-Raqqa as a viable threat and reportedly </span><a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/kurdish-syrian-force-advances-on-key-border-town-held-by-islamic-state/2015/06/13/07355388-11db-11e5-a0fe-dccfea4653ee_story.html"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">directed</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> residents of the city to stockpile
food supplies in preparation for a potential siege. Any such offensive would
require an attack by YPG and Euphrates Volcano fighters against the ISIS-held
town of Ayn Issa and its associated Brigade 93 base, located south of Tel Abyad
along the highway to ar-Raqqa City. However, the extent to which the YPG
remains willing to advance outside of the Kurdish-majority regions of its
envisioned Rojava remains unclear and Syrian Kurds may alternatively prioritize
efforts against remaining direct threats to their own borders, such as the
enduring ISIS presence in Sarrin southwest of Kobani or the regime remnants in Hasakah
Province. Nevertheless, the ascendance of the YPG and the position it maintains
between Syrian rebels and the regime will continue to form a key factor in
dictating the options available to the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition in Syria.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-10444849965086742322015-06-12T12:06:00.000-07:002015-06-12T12:06:36.654-07:00Likely Courses of Action in the Syrian Civil War: June - December 2015<div style="text-align: center;">
<i>by: Jennifer Cafarella with Christopher Kozak</i></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<i><br /></i></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
The purpose of this intelligence forecast is to outline ISW’s assessment of the courses of action available to Syrian actors and their principal benefactors over the next six months. ISW assesses that the dynamic stalemate that has defined the Syrian civil war since 2013 may be broken in this timeframe. The expansion of ISIS’s maneuver campaign into Syria’s central corridor is one potential inflection that could change the course of the war by shattering the Assad regime’s area defense strategy in western Syria. Rebel groups and Jabhat al-Nusra are also positioned to escalate their offensives against the regime in southern and northern Syria, and their aggregate effect may force a contraction of the Syrian Arab Army in the mid-term. Alternately, the regime along with increasing Iranian support may alter its battlefield disposition to concentrate upon limited offensive operations against key rebel positions in pursuit of decisive effects, especially in Damascus. The range of actions that various actors in Syria may take generate a spectrum of possible outcomes for the Syrian war and its potential post-war environment, several of which are perilous to U.S. policy in the Middle East and current strategies to defeat ISIS in the coming year. This assessment will forecast the most likely and most dangerous contingencies that may transpire in Syria in the second half of 2015 from a U.S. policy perspective.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<b>Read the entire forecast <a href="http://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/likely-courses-action-syrian-civil-war-june-december-2015" target="_blank">here</a></b></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
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<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-WrEjIPs9knA/VXsZm5rXjuI/AAAAAAAADhI/vRJiwzRrhzI/s1600/SYR%2BMLCOA-01.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-WrEjIPs9knA/VXsZm5rXjuI/AAAAAAAADhI/vRJiwzRrhzI/s1600/SYR%2BMLCOA-01.png" /></a></div>
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-x9tKsZpcHSc/VXsZoqOI66I/AAAAAAAADhQ/LIchn7PqreY/s1600/SYR%2BMDCOA-01.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-x9tKsZpcHSc/VXsZoqOI66I/AAAAAAAADhQ/LIchn7PqreY/s1600/SYR%2BMDCOA-01.png" /></a></div>
Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-55561140922718967632015-06-02T16:54:00.000-07:002015-06-02T16:54:40.711-07:00Syria Situation Report: May 27-June 2, 2015<div style="text-align: center;">
<i>by: Christopher Kozak</i></div>
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Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-25202385149031047102015-05-29T15:05:00.000-07:002015-05-29T15:05:03.669-07:00ISIS Control and Expected Offensives in Central Syria: May 29, 2015<div style="text-align: center;">
<i>by: Christopher Kozak and Jennifer Cafarella</i></div>
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Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-5876241036614498962015-05-29T11:51:00.001-07:002015-05-29T15:21:32.795-07:00The Jabhat al-Nusra and Rebel Campaign for Idlib Province<div style="text-align: center;">
<i>by: Jennifer Cafarella</i></div>
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Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) seized control of Ariha, the final regime stronghold in Idlib Province, alongside allied Islamist rebels on May 28, 2015. This victory secures effective control over Idlib Province to JN and rebel forces, the second Syrian province to fall out of Assad’s control after ISIS-held Raqqa. A number of isolated and besieged regime positions remain in Idlib, including the Abu ad-Duhor military airbase that has been under JN siege since December 2014. Regime forces have reportedly begun to withdraw from villages along the Ariha- Jisr al-Shughour road as they absorb the loss of Ariha, indicating that JN and rebel forces are unlikely to face considerable resistance as they move to consolidate control over remaining pockets of regime-held terrain. Moderate rebel forces in the province played relatively marginal roles in the recent advances, often limited to providing artillery and other support to hardline Islamist and jihadist groups allied to JN. As a result, JN and its allies are likely to acquire a high level of influence in the governance and security structures that emerge in the newly-“liberated” province as a consequence of their significant military contributions to anti-Assad victories. This is a major strategic setback for the U.S. in Syria, as it cements JN gains in northern Syria to date, validates its methodology, and provides considerable momentum to its carefully tailored effort to mold rebel-held Syria into a post-Assad state that is governed by Shari’a law and ultimately a component of al-Qaeda’s envisioned global Caliphate. The regime continues to respond to military defeats with the indiscriminate use of airpower, barrel bombs, and weaponized chlorine gas attacks, and can be expected to maintain its effort to punish civilian populations in Idlib as anti-Assad forces formalize their control.</div>
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<i>For more on JN strategy and intent in Syria, see: <a href="http://www.understandingwar.org/report/jabhat-al-nusra-syria" target="_blank">"Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria: an Islamic Emirate for al-Qaeda,"</a> Jennifer Cafarella, Institute for the Study of War, December 2014</i></div>
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Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-28912370505424690512015-05-29T11:28:00.001-07:002015-05-29T11:28:15.502-07:00The Regime's Military Capabilities: Part 2<div style="text-align: center;">
<i style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;">This analysis of the Syrian regime’s military capabilities is adapted from the ISW report <a href="http://understandingwar.org/report/army-all-corners-assads-campaign-strategy-syria" target="_blank">“An Army in All Corners”--Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria</a> by ISW Syria Analyst <a href="http://www.understandingwar.org/press-media/staff-bios/christopher-kozak" target="_blank">Christopher Kozak</a> (April 2015).<br /><br />Today's excerpt looks at the Iranian proxies operating in Syria. </i><i><span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">The final installment in this series will focus on the regime’s offensive campaign in and around Damascus. Read the previous installments on: the <a href="http://iswsyria.blogspot.com/2015/05/the-regimes-strategic-objectives.html" target="_blank">regime's strategic objectives</a> and the<a href="http://iswsyria.blogspot.com/2015/05/the-regimes-military-capabilities-part-1.html" target="_blank"> regime’s military capabilities (Part 1)</a>.</span></i></div>
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<b style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;"><i>May 29 Update:</i> As ISIS consolidates its grip over the strategic central Syrian city of Palmyra and JN-led rebel forces move towards securing full control over Idlib Province in the north, the Syrian regime has come to rely upon increasing support from the Islamic Republic of Iran. Last week, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad met with a senior advisor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Damascus who emphasized that “Iran is determined to continue to stand by Syria and support it with whatever is needed”. A day later, Iranian officials reportedly approved a new line of credit and several investment deals with the embattled Assad regime. However, Iranian assistance to Assad does not end at financial support. Iran has provided increasing amounts of advisors, technical experts, and foreign fighters to bolster the Syrian regime’s war-fighting capacity through both the indirect participation of Iranian proxy groups such as Lebanese Hezbollah and the direct intervention of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) members. Below you will find details about the spectrum of Iranian forces currently operating in Syria and the implications for the wider region.</b></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br />The Assad regime suffers from several limitations which have had a severe impact upon its military strategy. Regime forces operated under shortages of quality manpower due to desertion, defection, and combat attrition. Consequently, the Assad regime relied upon a constellation of regular and irregular forces throughout 2014 in order to prosecute its offensive campaign and defend its core interests against the Syrian opposition and other threats, including ISIS. The network of pro-regime fighters lacked the capacity to deliver a clear victory over rebel forces due to deficits in manpower, morale, and battlefield acumen. However, Assad, with likely impetus from his Iranian advisors, used this time to restructure his forces in a manner designed to sustain their operations in conditions of protracted war. These developments ensure the survival of the regime at the cost of extended humanitarian suffering and deepening polarization. An examination of the ‘tools’ available to the regime is essential to understanding the conduct of the Syrian military campaign throughout 2014 and into 2015. The main components of the force coalition preserving Assad’s position in Syria include the Syrian Arab Army, pro-regime Syrian paramilitary organizations, Iranian foreign proxy fighters, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the regime’s own asymmetric military arsenal.</span></div>
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The Assad regime relies upon the coalition of Shi’a foreign fighters referred to as the Iranian “Axis of Resistance” that is organized, trained, and equipped by Iran. Assessments released in December 2013 estimated that between 7,000 and 8,000 foreign fighters drawn from Iranian proxy groups were engaged in active combat in Syria on behalf of the regime. These forces played important roles on critical battlegrounds across Syria due to their expertise in irregular combat. Lebanese Hezbollah plays a dominant role, with Israeli military officials assessing in summer fighters on rotation in Syria in Damascus, Qalamoun, Homs, Latakia, Aleppo, and southern Syria. Hezbollah militants provided key training and leadership functions to pro-regime paramilitary organizations such as the NDF along with their frontline combat duties. The Syrian regime also received reinforcements from Iraqi Shi’a militias as well as Lebanese and Afghan Shi’a populations who joined front groups such as Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFAB) and Liwa Zulfiqar. An estimated 3,000 to 4,000 Iraqi, Lebanese, and Afghan Shi’a fighters were fighting alongside the regime in Syria by June 2014, concentrated mainly in Damascus and Aleppo cities. </div>
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The fall of Mosul to ISIS on June 10, 2014 and the rapid expansion of ISIS-held terrain inside Iraq redirected Iranian attention from Syria to Iraq. This was a major inflection point for both Iranian regional strategy and the disposition of Iranian proxy forces inside Syria. Large numbers of Iraqi Shi’a withdrew from such Syrian battlefronts as southern Aleppo city and Mleiha in Damascus in order to return to Iraq, forcing the regime to recalibrate ongoing offensives. One rebel fighter in Mleiha stated that “we used to hear fighters with Iraqi accents on our radios, but now they have Lebanese accents…since last week, we haven’t seen as much shelling or storming of our positions.” Iranian news sources reported that a large portion of Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas specifically traveled to the Balad district north of Baghdad in order to counter ISIS advances there. Over 1,000 Iraqi Shi’a fighters had reportedly left Syria to fight in Iraq by June 17.</div>
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Hezbollah quickly expanded its combat operations to compensate for the departure of Iraqi Shi’a militias from the battlefield, as foreshadowed by the rebel fighter interviewed above. Hezbollah announced a general mobilization on June 12, 2014, two days after the fall of Mosul, and deployed more than 1,000 fighters to “defend the Sayyida Zeinab shrine.” Casualties mounted as rebel forces utilized the resultant disruption to mount successful raids and ambushes against Hezbollah positions, particularly in the Qalamoun region. The growing commitments in Syria stretched Hezbollah thin and forced it to adjust its recruitment standards. Hezbollah began enrolling Syrian citizens into Hezbollah-affiliated forces by June 2014 and deployed increasing numbers of young, inexperienced Lebanese fighters to the frontlines. This was a stark contrast to the seasoned fighters who had participated in the battle for Qusayr. One Hezbollah veteran complained in an interview with Foreign Policy in January 2015 that he “barely recognized” the organization due to the lack of discipline displayed by its new recruits. Hezbollah fighters have nevertheless maintained a major presence in the Qalamoun Mountains while playing a prominent role in key regime offensives in Damascus, Aleppo city, the southern provinces of Dera’a, and Quneitra near the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights over the course of late 2014 and early 2015. </div>
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The fall of Mosul also prompted a demographic shift in the Shi’a foreign volunteers fighting alongside the Assad regime. Replacements for the dwindling number of Iraqi Shi’a in Syria came from Afghanistan’s Shi’a Hazara community, which speaks dialects of Persian and possesses close historical ties to Iran. News reports as early as 2013 indicated that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps had enlisted thousands of Afghan refugees to fight in Syria in exchange for $500 monthly salaries, school registration, and Iranian residency permits. Afghan fighters captured in Syria in October 2014 have, however, confirmed these reports, stating that Iran had also provided training in light and medium weapons. Funeral notices in March 2015 for Ali Reza Tavassoli, the Iranian commander of the majority-Afghan “Fatimiyoun Brigade,” highlighted the link between Afghan Shi’a fighters and the IRGC by revealing a close relationship between Tavassoli and IRGC-Quds Force commander Qassem Suleimani. Afghan Shi’a fighter participation alongside the Assad regime became increasingly visible throughout the latter half of 2014 and into 2015. </div>
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b><i><span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Fatimiyoun Brigade commander Ali Reza Tavassoli (right) with IRGC-Quds Forces commander Qassem Suleimani</span></i></b></td></tr>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Iraqi and Iranian fighters in Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas reportedly continued to conduct operations alongside regime forces in lesser numbers in the outer environs of Damascus city, particularly the towns of al-Zabadani and Darayya as of March 2015. A pro-regime fighter captured by rebel forces in October 2014 claimed that LAFAB was also active in the northern outskirts of Aleppo city. Unconfirmed reports throughout late 2014 and early 2015 also indicated that smaller numbers of fighters from other Shi’a Muslim communities, including ethnic Sham from Cambodia and Houthi tribesmen from Yemen, have been mobilized by the IRGC on behalf of the Assad regime. </span></div>
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Official Iranian military presence became more visible in Syria in 2014 in tandem with the growing visibility of Iranian proxy forces. IRGC-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and IRGC-Ground Forces (IRGC-GF) personnel operated inside Syria in 2012-2013, providing intelligence, paramilitary training, and senior-level advisory support to the Assad regime. Direct Iranian support to Assad serves to preserve the existence of a friendly regime in the heart of the Middle East bordering the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Syria also provides Iran access to key supply routes used to deliver weapons to other regional Iranian proxies, including Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas. Heavy involvement in the organization of paramilitary groups and foreign volunteer units in Syria has allowed Iran to develop a base of support which could preserve Iranian regional influence even if the Assad regime collapsed. </div>
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Over time the Iranian advisory mission evolved to encompass IRGC trainers directly embedded with pro-regime forces. The exact extent of IRGC presence within Syria remains difficult to quantify. One former senior Iranian official stated to a Reuters reporter in February 2014 that a “few hundred” IRGC-QF and IRGC-GF commanders operated in Syria, while a former IRGC commander told the same reporter that only sixty to seventy “top” Quds Force commanders were in the country at any one time. Both sources also indicated that volunteers from the Iranian ‘Basij’ paramilitary formed a component of the irregular forces operating under IRGC command in Syria. </div>
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The depth and breadth of Iranian involvement in Syria grew significantly through 2014 and into 2015. Opposition sources consistently reported throughout the summer of 2014 the presence of unspecified Iranian officers and fighters on the frontlines in northern Hama Province amidst rebel offensives which directly threatened the Hama Military Airport. Activists claimed in September 2014 that regime offensives in the area were jointly commanded by SAA Special Forces commander Col. Suhail al-Hassan and a “young IRGC officer.” Rebel sources also stated in late November 2014 that IRGC advisors participated alongside Lebanese Hezbollah in an offensive on the town of Sheikh Miskin in Dera’a Province. These reports raise key questions about the extent to which Assad and senior regime officials have subordinated the Syrian military campaign to Iranian interests. </div>
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Mounting reports of Iranian casualties also served as an indicator of the ongoing shift from senior-level IRGC advisement to direct IRGC field command over pro-regime forces. Rebel forces killed and beheaded IRGC-GF Brigadier General Abdollah Eskandari on May 28, 2014 near the town of Morek in northern Hama Province. Iranian media claimed that Eskandari, the head of the Fars Province Foundation for Martyrs and Self-Sacrifice Affairs until 2013, had died protecting the Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Damascus. IRGC ‘Basij’ commander General Jabbar Drisawi was killed on the Handarat front north of Aleppo city five months later on October 16, 2014. Drisawi was reportedly an Arab, making it likely that he served as an Arabic-speaking trainer and advisor for Syrian NDF forces. Regional news sources reported three days later that IRGC commander Hassan Hizbawi had been killed in Sheikh Miskin. The presence of these senior Iranian officers in such close proximity to active frontlines suggests that IRGC commanders have directly embedded with pro-regimes forces on the battlefield. </div>
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A recent counteroffensive against rebel forces in southern Syria offers the most dramatic indicator of the influence currently wielded by IRGC-aligned forces in Syria. A large force of Hezbollah, Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas, and Fatimiyoun Brigade fighters supported by regime forces launched a major attack along a thirteen kilometer stretch of northwestern Dera’a Province on February 9, 2015, successfully seizing several key positions held by opposition forces. The leading role played by the large number of Iranian proxy forces participating in this operation suggests heavy IRGC involvement in its design and execution. Notably, an Israeli airstrike three weeks prior to the start of the offensive killed several senior Hezbollah figures in Quneitra province as well as IRGC-QF Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Allahdadi, who reportedly served as the IRGC liaison to the Assad regime. The emplacement of Hezbollah and other Iranian proxy forces along the border with the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights is likely a key strategic objective of Iran in Syria. Taken in conjunction, these incidents may thus reflect the deepening extent which Iranian interests play in directing regime military campaigns, particularly in southern Syria.</div>
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Several key indicators support reports of direct Iranian supervision over the military campaign in southern Syria. Numerous relatively low-ranking IRGC members were reportedly killed during the February 2015 offensive in Dera’a Province, including Fatimiyoun Brigade commander Ali Reza Tavassoli, IRGC 2nd Lieutenant Mohammad Ardekani, and IRGC Captain Mohammad Sahib Karam, suggesting a heightened presence of embedded Iranian advisors. IRGC-QF commander Qassem Suleimani also reportedly visited pro-regime units in Dera’a in February 10, 2015, providing weight to claims of senior Iranian command-and-control over the operation. Meanwhile, pro-opposition sources reported that Iranian officers executed up to a dozen Syrian regime personnel on charges of collaborating with rebel forces in the lead up to the offensive. Regime Political Security head Rustom Ghazali, a resident of Dera’a Province, was sacked and reportedly beaten for his alleged opposition to the prominent role played by Iranian-aligned forces in southern Syria. These reports marked a major departure in the pattern of Iranian operations in Syria, suggesting both the depth of Iranian interest in southern Syria as well as growing regime and Iranian concern regarding opposition momentum in Dera’a and Quneitra Provinces. </div>
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The IRGC has simultaneously worked aggressively to expand its recruitment of Syrian civilians in order to build an indigenous paramilitary apparatus that would remain loyal to its interests in the event of a collapse of the Assad regime. In a speech given in May 2014, IRGC-GF Brigadier General Hossein Hamedani lauded the establishment of a so-called “second Hezbollah” in Syria. Anonymous sources suggest that the Quds Forces seeks to maintain a “Syrian Hezbollah” comprised of Iraqi, Lebanese, and Syrian volunteers which could serve as a direct military liaison and Iranian proxy for the indefinite future. Although this organization likely serves as a blanket term for the coalition of paramilitary and proxy groups organized by Iran in Syria rather than a distinct military entity, Iran almost certainly seeks to build a military structure which can continue to assert Iranian influence in Syria in the event of the severe weakening or collapse of the Assad regime. </div>
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Several reports of independent IRGC recruitment efforts in Syria in late 2014 support the notion that the formation of a Syrian proxy force directly commanded by the IRGC is an Iranian priority. An activist in Hama interviewed in February 2015 stated that IRGC officers oversee an enlistment campaign in the city which directly competes with regime Air Force Intelligence for new recruits. Rebel sources also claim that the IRGC conducts similar recruitment in rural Homs Province. Regional observers have also noted the presence of Syrian Shi’a paramilitary organizations modeled on Hezbollah, such as the National Ideological Resistance, which operate in coastal Syria and may form the core of the IRGC vision of a “Syrian Hezbollah.” Iran appears to be nurturing this pool of future manpower through religious outreach. For example, Iranian-funded Shi’a theology schools have begun spreading throughout Tartous Province in a move designed to strengthen an Iranian-style Shi’a religious identity among Syrian Alawites. IRGC Brig. Gen. Hamedani has also personally praised the establishment of ‘Keshab’ youth groups in Syria meant to promote “spirituality” and the “revolutionary values” of the Islamic Republic. These developments suggest that Assad may no longer be a fully autonomous actor and ultimately threaten regime control over its own security forces.</div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><b><b>Next installment: <i>The Regime's Offensive Campaign: Damascus and Environs</i></b></b></span></div>
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Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-69283653916386345752015-05-28T15:34:00.000-07:002015-05-28T19:49:26.772-07:00Control in Syria: May 28, 2015<div style="text-align: center;">
<i>by: ISW Syria Team</i></div>
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Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-13511214219632481992015-05-26T15:20:00.000-07:002015-05-26T15:26:30.039-07:00Syria Situation Report: May 21-26, 2015<div style="text-align: center;">
<i>by: Christopher Kozak</i></div>
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Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-17472401444010005962015-05-26T13:46:00.000-07:002015-05-26T13:46:29.532-07:00The Regime's Military Capabilities: Part 1<div style="text-align: justify;">
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<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><i>This analysis of the Syrian regime’s military capabilities is adapted from the ISW report <a href="http://understandingwar.org/report/army-all-corners-assads-campaign-strategy-syria">“An Army in All Corners”: Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria</a> by ISW Syria Analyst Christopher Kozak (April 2015). Today's excerpt </i></span><span style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;"><i>looks at the Syrian Arab Army, paramilitary organizations, and the regime's“asymmetric” capabilities, such as its air force, missiles, and chemical weapons. </i></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;"><i>The next installment in this series will focus on the Iranian proxies in Syria. Read the first installment on the regime's strategic objectives <a href="http://iswsyria.blogspot.com/2015/05/the-regimes-strategic-objectives.html" target="_blank">here</a>.</i></span></div>
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<br /><b><i>May 26 Update:</i> On May 24, the regime-appointed governor of Homs Province Talal Barazi claimed that regime forces are preparing for a counteroffensive targeting the strategic city of Palmyra after its fall to ISIS on May 20. However, clear indications of a military mobilization have yet to materialize and it remains unclear whether the Assad regime possesses sufficient combat reserves to significantly reverse ISIS’s recent gains. Regime forces are spread thin throughout the country, forcing Assad to rely upon a small number of trusted elite units and deployable paramilitary fighters – the same composition of forces allegedly participating in the operation to retake Palmyra - to react to emergent threats.</b></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: large;">The Syrian Army, Paramilitaries, and Asymmetric Capabilities</span></b></div>
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The Assad regime suffers from several limitations which have had a severe impact upon its military strategy. Regime forces operated under shortages of quality manpower due to desertion, defection, and combat attrition. Consequently, the Assad regime relied upon a constellation of regular and irregular forces throughout 2014 in order to prosecute its offensive campaign and defend its core interests against the Syrian opposition and other threats, including ISIS. The network of pro-regime fighters lacked the capacity to deliver a clear victory over rebel forces due to deficits in manpower, morale, and battlefield acumen. However, Assad, with likely impetus from his Iranian advisors, used this time to restructure his forces in a manner designed to sustain their operations in conditions of protracted war. These developments ensure the survival of the regime at the cost of extended humanitarian suffering and deepening polarization. An examination of the ‘tools’ available to the regime is essential to understanding the conduct of the Syrian military campaign throughout 2014 and into 2015. The main components of the force coalition preserving Assad’s position in Syria include the Syrian Arab Army, pro-regime Syrian paramilitary organizations, Iranian foreign proxy fighters, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the regime’s own asymmetric military arsenal.</div>
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<b>The Syrian Arab Army</b></div>
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The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) functioned as a mainstay of the Syrian regime throughout 2014 and into 2015. The Syrian Army as an institution retained its loyalty to President Bashar al-Assad despite the defection of sizeable numbers of SAA soldiers throughout 2011 and 2012. Syrian forces remaining on the battlefield are battle-tested and largely committed to the survival of the regime. However, over the past year the Syrian Arab Army continued to grapple with two chronic problems that constrained the regime’s ability to effectively deploy its conventional advantage against opposition forces. </div>
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For one, the Syrian Arab Army continues to suffer severe manpower problems due to ongoing pressures of defection, desertion, and combat attrition in 2015 (read “<a href="http://iswsyria.blogspot.com/2014/12/the-assad-regime-under-stress.html">The Assad Regime UnderStress: Conscription and Protest among Alawite and Minority Populations inSyria</a>”). Three years of war have reduced the SAA by nearly half, from a pre-war high of approximately 300,000 troops to a 2014 estimate of 150,000-175,000 men. These sharp reductions stretched the SAA’s ability to hold terrain and forced the regime to prioritize the use of its limited offensive capability. Manpower shortages also prevent the SAA from decisively defeating the Syrian opposition on the battlefield. Military analyst David Kilcullen estimated in March 2014 that pro-regime forces maintained at maximum only a 2.5-to-1 soldier-to-insurgent force ratio against the Syrian opposition at that time,27 a condition which has likely deteriorated further one year later. Kilcullen also noted that the Assad regime possessed less than half of the troop-to- population ratio traditionally assessed as necessary for a successful counterinsurgency campaign.<br />
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The Syrian Arab Army also remained handicapped by regime suspicions regarding the loyalty and reliability of mainline SAA combat units. Analysis of the Syrian Army’s 2011-2012 military campaign suggested that the regime could only reliably deploy 65,000 to 75,000 of its troops in offensive operations, mainly elite units such as the Republican Guard, the Special Forces, and the 4th Armored Division commanded by President Assad’s brother Maher al-Assad. Meanwhile, regular army units – mainly comprised of rank-and-file conscripted Sunnis deemed ‘untrustworthy’ by the regime – were confined to defensive positions or limited offensives in close proximity to their bases. In the words of one Damascus based SAA commander in April 2013, “Most of the soldiers in my unit are Sunnis. They don’t trust me, and I don’t trust them.” Two years later, the vast majority of regular SAA units remained bound to their assigned home stations, largely concentrated in Dera’a and Damascus Provinces as an artifact of a pre-2011 military doctrine designed to provide defense in depth against an Israeli offensive towards Damascus.</div>
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The Syrian regime continued to rely upon its trusted elite SAA units throughout 2014 as a mobile offensive force often dispatched to augment regular SAA forces along critical battlefronts. Throughout 2014 and early 2015, the Republican Guard and 4th Armored Division, units specifically designated to protect the regime, conducted most of their operations in the vicinity of Damascus targeting major pockets of opposition forces occupying the Eastern and Western Ghouta suburbs of the city. Detachments from these units have also been deployed throughout the country in order to reinforce priority fronts. A detachment of the 104th Republican Guard Brigade under the command of Brigadier General Issam Zahreddine deployed to Deir ez-Zour Military Airbase in early 2014 to bolster its beleaguered defenders and preserve the regime presence in Deir ez-Zour city. Elements from the 106th Republican Guard Brigade and the 4th Armored Division also participated in repelling a rebel offensive against the Hama Military Airport in late 2014. The Republican Guard sent multiple waves of reinforcements to Aleppo city throughout 2014 to assist the regime encirclement campaign of the city, while the 4th Armored Division provided at least forty tanks to support a joint regime-Hezbollah offensive in Dera’a Province launched in February 2015 meant to reverse significant rebel gains.</div>
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Special Forces regiments of the SAA in particular are employed as quick-reaction forces across Syria. In an interview with the BBC in November 2014, one Special Forces commander recited his deployments: a year-and-a-half in Idlib Province, seven months in Aleppo city, and sixteen months in the Damascus suburbs. The Suqour al-Sahara [Desert Hawks] Brigade of the Special Forces spent most of late 2014 and early 2015 combatting ISIS militants in eastern Homs Province with future reassignments planned to either Aleppo or Dera’a Province. The 47th Special Forces Regiment, typically based out of Homs and Hama Provinces, deployed to northeastern Syria in late 2014 to confront ISIS in Hasaka Province. </div>
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This rapid cycling of combat tours provides a clear indication of the regime’s reliance on a small but loyal core of elite forces and suggests limited availability of elite troops, causing Assad to continually redirect these forces against emergent threats in a reactive manner.</div>
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The repeated deployments of a small number of military units also fuels increasing decentralization within the Syrian Arab Army. Elite SAA units such as the Republican Guards have been consistently deployed across the country in small-scale contingents as both independent detachments and as embedded reinforcements to regular SAA units over the past several years. These observations suggest that the SAA has restructured in favor of smaller military formations directed by command-and-control elements located in the field rather than in rear headquarters. This is likely an adaptation reflecting the demand for forward leadership in remote locations, possibly due to low conscript morale. This trend towards decentralization within the formal Syrian Arab Army represents a complementary process to the increasing regime reliance on paramilitary militia organizations.</div>
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<b>Paramilitary Organizations</b></div>
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The Assad regime has increasingly come to rely upon the mobilization of loyalist paramilitary and militia organizations in 2014-2015 as a solution to the endemic problem of manpower in the Syrian Arab Army. Regime supporters mobilized community-level patronage networks in the early months of the Syrian Revolution in order to mobilize hundreds of disparate ‘shabiha’ criminal gangs and ‘Popular Committee’ neighborhood defense groups. The Syrian regime incorporated the shabiha into an organization called the National Defense Forces (NDF) in early 2013. Members of the NDF received licensing, armaments, and salaries directly from the Syrian regime according to August 2013 reporting. Syrian security officials admitted shortly thereafter that assistance from Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah played a key role in the formalization of the NDF along the model of the Iranian ‘Basij’ militia. NDF recruits received training in urban guerilla warfare from Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah instructors at facilities inside Syria, Lebanon, and Iran. There are no indications that the nature of this partnership has changed as of April 2015.</div>
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The National Defense Forces functionally became a branch of the regime military by early 2014. The new organization soared in membership, with estimates ranging from 60,000 to 100,000 fighters available to hold territory, guard key supply routes, and otherwise augment SAA forces in the field by March 2014. Two Western correspondents reported in February 2015 that every checkpoint along a long and winding 1,200 kilometer journey from Aleppo city to Damascus had been manned by NDF militiamen instead of regular SAA soldiers. The Assad regime sought to leverage the growing strength of volunteers in the National Defense Forces throughout 2014 as an alternative to the conscripted forces of the regular SAA. Many enlistees preferred the NDF due to the organization’s emphasis on hometown service, making it an attractive alternative to service in the SAA. The regime in response turned to incentive structures and pay scales in order to encourage frontline duty. Regime commanders, according to a November 2014 report, retained the authority to relocate NDF units to active conflict zones if circumstances warranted.</div>
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Increasing regime reliance on the NDF has opened the regime to the inherent risks of providing state-sanctioned power to decentralized paramilitary organizations. The National Defense Forces, the Carter Center notes, are “still, at their core, community-based militias whose local interests may at times be at odds with national-level government strategies.” Local NDF commanders often engage in war profiteering through protection rackets, looting, and organized crime. NDF members have been implicated in waves of murders, robberies, thefts, kidnappings, and extortions throughout regime-held parts of Syria since the formation of the organization in 2013. This tradeoff between security and lawlessness generated by the devolution of further power to local militia formations ultimately poses a threat to Assad’s ability to maintain agency over his military campaign. <br />
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Units of the National Defense Forces have also come into increasing conflict with official representatives of the Assad regime. The growing excesses of the NDF forced Assad to undertake efforts to rein its irregular forces back under state control. Reports emerged in November 2014 indicating that the Assad regime intended to announce several initiatives to restructure the NDF into “National Security Committees” in order to establish greater control.64 Members of the National Security Committees would hold two to ten year contracts and answer directly to the Syrian Ministry of Defense. Several sources also indicated that the Committees would incorporate former rebel fighters and other “dissident troops” as part of a process of “national reconciliation.” Assad may have calculated that integrating former opposition members and NDF militiamen under one umbrella could entice further rebel defections with a clear demonstration of amnesty. The integration of former rebel fighters into the “National Security Committees” would also build an internal tension into the organization which would keep its constituent factions in check. However, besides isolated complaints in late 2014 that the regime had ceased paying NDF salaries on time, no further indications of this reconciliation program have emerged as of April 2015.</div>
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The fragmentation of authority presented by the National Defense Forces is compounded by the presence of dozens of smaller, local pro-regime paramilitary forces operating outside the bounds of the NDF structure. These actors maintain a wide variety of affiliations and dispositions, such as those detailed in the corresponding chart, and all remain active in 2015. Dozens of other locally-focused paramilitary groups continue to exert influence in their immediate community outside the structures of the NDF. The widespread dissemination of these paramilitary organizations serves the immediate military interests of the Assad regime but ultimately constrains state power in a manner which threatens to promote the spread of further disorder.</div>
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<b>Asymmetric Capabilities</b></div>
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The intricate pro-regime coalition of regular, irregular, and Iranian proxy forces fighting on behalf of Assad in Syria remains insufficient to exert the regime’s influence across all of Syria. The Assad regime has thus made heavy use of the asymmetric capabilities at its disposal to gain advantages over rebel forces on the battlefield with minimal military risk. These strategic weapons systems, including a sizeable air force, a ballistic missile arsenal, and a chemical weapons program, partly compensate for the limitations of pro-regime ground forces. These weapons are ultimately insufficient to overcome opposition forces despite serving a key function in the survival of the Assad regime. Instead, they depopulate and demoralize opposition-controlled areas. The indiscriminate nature of regime airstrikes and chemical weapons attacks results in continued humanitarian disaster on a massive scale and fuels the narrative of jihadist factions which accuse the regime of conducting a systematic sectarian campaign to destroy Syria’s Sunni population. </div>
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The air assets provided by the Syrian Air Force have been one of the primary advantages the Assad regime holds over rebel forces. Separate analyses of regime airstrike patterns in 2012 and 2014 concluded that the Syrian Air Force only possesses between 200 and 300 combat-capable aircraft due to maintenance requirements, poor optimization for ground attack roles, and wartime attrition. Despite losses, the Syrian Air Force has maintained an impressive cycle of operations. Analysts drawing from opposition sources estimated that the Syrian regime continued to conduct approximately fifty combat sorties per day throughout the country as of December 2014. The sustained nature of this air campaign requires a resilient resupply and logistical system. The Syrian Air Force receives heavy assistance in this task from Russia, which continues to provide pilot training, shipments of spare parts, weapons deliveries, and aircraft upgrade packages for the Syrian Air Force despite the ongoing conflict. This dependence further underscores the precarious challenges facing the Syrian Armed Forces which leave Assad unable to overwhelm the opposition despite his military advantages.</div>
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The Syrian Air Force possesses limited close air support technical capabilities and thus the majority of fixed wing strikes in Syria are “collective punishment” attacks against opposition-held areas in an attempt to deter and depopulate. Activists on the ground have reported numerous precision airstrikes against markets, schools, hospitals, bakeries, refugee camps, and other distinctively civilian targets. Meanwhile, Syrian Air Force helicopters continue to bombard residential neighborhoods indiscriminately throughout the country with ‘barrel bombs’ dropped from high altitudes in order to avoid anti-aircraft fire. Data from the Violations Documentation Center in Syria indicated that the combination of these aerial attacks accounted for thirty-nine percent of civilian fatalities between August and October 2014. </div>
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The fixed wing aircraft of the Syrian Air Force also demonstrate reasonable effectiveness in a close air support (CAS) role despite their limitations. Concentrated airstrikes have been used to both support regime offensive operations and blunt opposition advances throughout the country in 2014.124 However, relatively frequent friendly fire incidents have underscored the limits of Syrian Air Force CAS capabilities.125 Regime aircraft also conduct numerous strikes against government positions captured by opposition forces in an attempt to destroy captured military equipment. For example, the Syrian Air Force bombarded Storage Base 559 northeast of Damascus after opposition fighters captured the position in March 2014, destroying 70 out of the 105 tanks stored on site. Similarly, warplanes targeted the Wadi al- Deif military base in Idlib Province with at least forty-two strikes after its capture by rebel forces in December 2014. </div>
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The regime also capitalized upon its previous barrel bomb tactic to maximize its destructive power against rebel strongholds in 2014. Regime specialists retooled barrel bomb designs in the first half of 2014 to feature stabilizing fins and impact fuses which greatly improved the chances of an effective blast. Later, the regime also incorporated chlorine gas cylinders into their improvised aerial weapons. The alleged injury of an ‘Iranian officer’ during a blast at a barrel bomb factory on November 28, 2014 in the Hama Military Airport suggests that this redesign may have been aided by Iranian technical advisors.130 Previously confining them to Idlib and Aleppo Provinces, the regime expanded the use of barrel bombs throughout Syria in 2014, including Hama, Latakia, Damascus, and Dera’a Provinces. Barrel bombs have even been utilized in the remote northeastern province of Hasaka in early 2015. </div>
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The Syrian regime reprioritized its air assets following ISIS’s assault on Mosul in June 2014 to attack ISIS positions in the remote eastern provinces of ar-Raqqa, Hasaka, and Deir ez-Zour. Numerous analysts noted that the strikes constituted a gesture through which the Assad regime signaled its desire to partner with the international community against terrorism. Assad’s airstrikes produce high civilian casualties, however, which U.S.-led coalition airstrikes have sought to minimize. The Syrian Air Force launched another wave of indiscriminate airstrikes against ISIS-controlled ar- Raqqa city in November 2014 following a lull in U.S.-led coalition airstrikes, killing nearly one hundred civilians.135 In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, one resident of ar- Raqqa summarized Assad’s intent: “It’s as though the regime wanted to say to its constituency and support base: We’re still here, and Raqqa is still within the reach of our firepower.” </div>
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However, the Assad regime primarily took advantage of coalition airstrikes in eastern Syria to redirect additional air assets against opposition forces throughout the western half of the country. One anonymous U.S. official commented that “It would be silly for them not to take advantage of the U.S. doing airstrikes…essentially, we’ve allowed them to perform an economy of force.” Analysis of regime airstrikes reported by SOHR between August and October 2014 confirms a dramatic shift of Syrian Air Force combat sorties from ar- Raqqa and Deir ez-Zour Provinces in favor of the opposition strongholds of Idlib, Dera’a, and Hama Provinces. These strikes have hindered rebel operations against the regime and exacted a vast human toll on civilian populations behind the frontlines, sparking further resentment and radicalization which may eventually pose a threat to Western nations perceived as turning a blind eye to regime excesses. </div>
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Meanwhile, the Assad regime has also continued to utilize chemical weapons against rebel forces despite an ongoing disarmament deal. The Syrian regime agreed to the total destruction of its chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities on September 14, 2013 and on June 23, 2014, the last shipment of declared chemical weapons departed from Latakia port for disposal. The demolition of twelve declared chemical weapons facilities is ongoing and scheduled for completion by the end of June 2015.145 The Assad regime, however, quickly turned to the use of chlorine, ammonia, and other dual-use industrial chemicals in order to maintain its asymmetric capabilities against the Syrian opposition. Human rights organizations and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) investigation teams have found “compelling evidence” that regime forces have deployed chlorine gas “systematically and repeatedly” throughout Syria. </div>
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An examination of alleged chlorine attacks in late August 2014 found that regime forces employ these chemical weapons in order to set the conditions for ground offensives against opposition strongholds or prevent opposition advances in areas where the regime cannot deploy large amounts of ground forces. On March 6, 2015, the UN Security Council adopted UNSC Resolution 2209 directly condemning the use of chlorine gas as a weapon in Syria and threatening that parties using these chemicals will be held accountable by the United Nations. However, international enforcement measures against such violations remain unclear and three days later regime forces reportedly used chlorine gas against the rebel-held town of Muzayrib in Dera’a Province. The persistent regime use of chemical weapons in flagrant violation of international norms only serves to generate additional civilian casualties and increase the appeal of extremist groups which portray the Syrian Civil War as an existential struggle against the regime.</div>
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Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-67449947626569565032015-05-22T08:17:00.000-07:002015-05-22T08:17:34.651-07:00Control of Terrain in Syria: May 22, 2015<div style="text-align: center;">
<i>by: ISW Syria Team</i></div>
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Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-5437283918900181272015-05-22T07:28:00.003-07:002015-05-22T10:30:34.963-07:00ISIS Sanctuary: May 22, 2014<div style="background-color: white; color: #212121; font-family: wf_segoe-ui_normal, 'Segoe UI', 'Segoe WP', Tahoma, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">
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<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-size: 11pt;">ISIS seized the Tanf border crossing between Iraq and Syria, circled in the map above. The status of the Walid border crossing on the Iraq side is still unknown and assessed to be contested.</span></span></div>
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Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-6812607648686035612015-05-21T12:21:00.001-07:002015-05-21T13:48:12.633-07:00The Regime's Strategic Objectives<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;">This analysis of the Syrian regime’s strategic objectives is adapted from the ISW report </span><a href="http://understandingwar.org/report/army-all-corners-assads-campaign-strategy-syria" style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;">“An Army in All Corners”: Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria</a><span style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;"> by ISW Syria Analyst </span><a href="http://understandingwar.org/press-media/staff-bios/christopher-kozak" style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;">Christopher Kozak</a><span style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;"> published in April 2015. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Times, 'Times New Roman', serif;"><b><i>May 21 Update: </i>The recent fall of the strategic city of Palmyra to ISIS highlights the risks faced by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as he attempts to counterbalance the regime’s increasingly-fraught military position with his desire to maintain an “Army in All Corners” strategy. Palmyra represented a key lynchpin in the system of remote outposts garrisoned by the regime throughout the country as a way of maintaining the appearance of a national presence while reinforcing Assad’s “own legitimacy as the only viable alternative to a failed, jihadist-dominated Syrian state.” The loss of Palmyra thus marks a major blow to the campaign designs of the Assad regime and signals that time may be running out for Assad’s plan to garner international support as the only effective anti-ISIS actor on the ground.</b></span></div>
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br />The military campaign of the Syrian regime has been primarily driven by Assad’s core objective to preserve his rule in a post-war Syria through a negotiated “political solution.” However, Assad’s efforts to drive the situation on the ground in a favorable direction faced a number of key challenges. The geographic dispersion of regime positions and the countrywide scope of the Syrian Civil War forced the Assad regime to prioritize among military fronts in 2014, enabling opposition forces to advance in multiple locations including Idlib and Dera’a Provinces. Salafi-jihadist rebel groups also grew in strength and coordination in 2014. The regime faced new challenges on the battlefield as the consolidation of military strength among JN, Ahrar al-Sham, and other Salafi-jihadist factions in Syria throughout 2014 enabled numerous major battlefield victories over the regime in Aleppo, Idlib, and Dera’a Provinces.</span></div>
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However, these developments also sparked new opportunities for Assad to align with the international community by fueling the narrative that the Syrian government faces an invasion of ‘terrorists’ that poses a transnational threat. Assad promoted this framing of the conflict in order to reinforce his own political legitimacy as the only viable alternative to a failed, jihadist-dominated Syrian state. Assad likely reasons that by avoiding decisive defeat and preserving his presence throughout the country, the insurgency will eventually be depleted as opposition forces grow increasingly radicalized and alienated from their domestic and international supporters.</div>
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<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-GfoPwn8phYI/VVzzeZSVBnI/AAAAAAAADTU/xlZex38gFhI/s1600/Assad%2BVisits%2BTroops%2Bin%2BJobar.PNG"><img border="0" height="458" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-GfoPwn8phYI/VVzzeZSVBnI/AAAAAAAADTU/xlZex38gFhI/s640/Assad%2BVisits%2BTroops%2Bin%2BJobar.PNG" width="640" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-size: x-small;"><b>Syrian President Bashar al-Assad Visits Troops in Jobar</b></span></div>
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<b>Maintaining Syrian Territorial Integrity</b></div>
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The Assad regime prioritizes maintaining Syrian Arab Army (SAA) presence throughout Syria in order to frame its claim to a united and contiguous post-war Syrian state. President Assad expressly delineated this policy in his January 2015 interview with Foreign Affairs, stating: “If you look at a military map now, the Syrian army exists in every corner. Not every place; by every corner, I mean north, south, east, west, and between. If you didn't believe in a unified Syria, that Syria can go back to its previous position, you wouldn't send the army there as a government.” The strategy of an “army in all corners” is designed to preclude a partitioned Syria or rump Syrian state from forming. The existence of SAA formations across Syria also provides President Assad with a political narrative as the leader of a sovereign and undivided country. Assad is unable, however, to use his dispersed footprint to establish security throughout the country in the face of an active armed opposition.</div>
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Assad’s remote outposts incur risk to his campaign. Their strict defensive posture and inability to project force into their surroundings makes them targetable by opposing forces. Limited options for reinforcement and resupply can leave their garrisons isolated and vulnerable in the face of concerted offensives. This risk was brutally demonstrated in July and August 2014 when ISIS militants overran a series of holdout regime military bases in ar-Raqqa and Hasaka Provinces, capturing and executing hundreds of SAA soldiers. Nevertheless, these strongholds also frequently withstand enemy attacks, providing the Assad regime with staying power at little cost. The besieged Wadi al-Deif and al-Hamidiyah military bases in southern Idlib Province, for example, fixed opposition forces for nearly two years before being overrun in a joint Jabhat al-Nusra (JN)–Ahrar al-Sham (HASI) operation in December 2014. Ultimately, this element of regime strategy fails when outposts are isolated and overwhelmed. This trend may accelerate in 2015 amidst increasing coordination between mainly-Islamist opposition forces.</div>
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<b>Dominating Human Terrain</b></div>
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The Assad regime also seeks to maintain its control over the Syrian civilian population in order to bolster its image as the only legitimate governance structure in the country. President Assad has repeatedly stated that the most critical battle in Syria is the one for the Syrian people. Assad also detailed this policy in his interview with Foreign Affairs: “Before talking about winning territory, talk about winning the hearts and minds and the support of the Syrian people. That’s what we have won. What’s left is logistical; it’s technical. That is a matter of time.” Experts estimate that the Syrian regime controls between 55 and 72 percent of the Syria’s remaining populace as of January 2015. The Syrian opposition, on the other hand, controls less than a third of the country’s population – affirming President Assad’s boast that “the communities which embraced terrorists have become very small.” Assad did not mention that the remainder of Syria’s population now lies within areas under the regime’s control as a deliberate outcome of Assad’s own punitive depopulation campaigns.</div>
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On the ground, this rhetoric translates into an extremely lethal form of population-centric counter-insurgency (COIN) in areas under opposition control. The Syrian regime inflicts mass punishment against civilians in opposition areas to force large-scale displacement. Regime ground forces besiege rebel-held neighborhoods and cities, cutting off aid supplies and spurring thousands to flee to regime zones of control in the face of starvation. Civilians in opposition-held zones are also subject to indiscriminate targeting by artillery, airstrikes, and crudely-devised “barrel bombs.” By March 2015, these barbaric methods had killed more than 220,000 Syrians and displaced over 11.5 million civilians, mainly from opposition-held terrain. In sum, the concentration of the Syrian population in territory controlled by Assad comes in large part as the result of a humanitarian crisis generated by the regime itself.</div>
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<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-DaK24332B2w/VVzzeZ7C1UI/AAAAAAAADTQ/bETxulbfPds/s1600/Syrian%2BDefense%2BMinister%2BFahd%2Bal-Freij.jpg"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-DaK24332B2w/VVzzeZ7C1UI/AAAAAAAADTQ/bETxulbfPds/s1600/Syrian%2BDefense%2BMinister%2BFahd%2Bal-Freij.jpg" /></a> </div>
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<span style="font-size: x-small;"><b>Syrian Defense Minister Fahd al-Freij</b></span></div>
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This disparity offers the Assad regime several distinct advantages over rebel forces. Control over the majority of the surviving Syrian population provides opportunity to tap manpower reserves to aid the regime’s fight and also restricts civilians from joining the Syrian opposition. The regime also benefits from enduring economic activity that generally no longer exists in rebel-held areas. Continuous efforts to depopulate opposition-held zones and consolidate civilians into regime-held areas feed into the narrative that “the majority of the Syrian people…support their president.” This argument manipulates Syria’s recent history and portrays the staying power of Bashar al-Assad and his government favorably in political negotiations. Acceptance of this statement at face value risks legitimizing mass violence against civilians as a tool which could be used in other conflicts.</div>
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<b>Projecting Domestic and International Legitimacy</b></div>
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The regime uses the appearance of enduring military and social control in Syria to bolster domestic and international legitimacy in preparation to discuss political settlement. Assad regularly uses “jihadism” in Syria as an argument to curry international favor. In an interview conducted on November 28, 2014, President Assad criticized U.S.-led coalition airstrikes against ISIS in Syria by insisting that “terrorism cannot be destroyed from the air, and you cannot achieve results on the ground without land forces.” Regime officials regularly promote the SAA as the only realistic force with the “experience in the field” to counter terrorist groups operating in Syria, such as JN or ISIS Assad reaffirmed in a later interview on January 20, 2015 that this partner “definitely…has to be Syrian troops.” In some cases, Assad backs his claims with force. The Syrian Air Force, for example, conducted several sorties against the ISIS “capital” of ar-Raqqa in a move clearly designed to align with the global anti-terrorism campaign following the launch of anti-ISIS coalition air raids in Syria on September 22, 2014.</div>
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The regime also attempts to maintain vestiges of democratic processes in order to underscore the claims of legitimacy made by the Syrian government. The 2014 Syrian presidential elections were widely held by regime officials as an expression of mass popular support for the Syrian government despite pervasive indications of fraud and voter suppression. The Assad regime retains a “tolerated” internal opposition group, the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (NCCDC), which provides a façade of political pluralism. On January 26, 2015, regime officials even traveled to Moscow to hold talks with NCCDC members. The NCCDC possesses no representation from either the exiled Syrian National Coalition (SNC) opposition government or the armed Syrian opposition on the ground. The delegations unsurprisingly agreed on most of the key building blocks of the regime’s political strategy, including the maintenance of Syrian unity and sovereignty, the importance of combating terrorism, and the necessity of a political settlement.</div>
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The Assad regime’s political goals generated a military strategy which remained relatively consistent throughout 2014 and into 2015 despite shifts in battlefield dynamics which forced the regime to adapt to new circumstances. These disruptions, including unexpected rebel successes in southern Syria and the withdrawal of thousands of allied Iraqi Shi’a fighters from Damascus following the fall of Mosul in June 2014, have often sparked key inflection points in the campaign for Syria. These shifts forced the regime to adapt its capabilities frequently, but they have rarely altered the ways in which regime forces have attempted to carry out the war. This resiliency indicates that the Assad regime possesses a coherent military strategy that has been robust enough to absorb the pressures of unanticipated events. Assad likely believes that upholding this clear plan of action while avoiding unnecessary risks on the battlefield will allow him to win the war for Syria without an outright military victory.</div>
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<b>Next installment:</b> <i><b>The Regime's Military Capabilities: Part 1--The Syrian Army, Paramilitaries, and Asymmetric Capabilities </b></i></div>
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</span>Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-10776030152841360152015-05-20T17:44:00.000-07:002015-05-21T13:45:08.766-07:00Control of Terrain in Syria: May 20, 2015<div style="text-align: center;">
<i>by: ISW Syria Team</i></div>
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Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-68874120127940600562015-05-20T17:12:00.000-07:002015-05-20T17:35:28.580-07:00Syria Situation Report: May 14-20, 2015<div style="text-align: center;">
<i>by: Jennifer Cafarella</i></div>
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Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-70721079130980154072015-05-14T14:31:00.000-07:002015-05-14T14:31:01.091-07:00New ISIS Offensives in the Syrian Civil War<div style="text-align: center;">
<i>By: Christopher Kozak</i></div>
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<b><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Key
Takeaway: </span></i></b><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">ISIS has neither been defeated nor
relegated entirely to the defensive in Syria despite a string of losses to
Kurdish forces assisted by U.S.-led coalition airstrikes. Instead, ISIS has launched
two major offensives targeting Syrian military positions in central and eastern
Syria since May 6, 2015, likely taking advantage of the Assad regime’s
preoccupation with recent JN and rebel advances in Idlib Province. A
consolidation of these gains would leave ISIS in position to contest and
potentially seize the most important remaining military installations in eastern
Syria, eliminating any potential roadblocks to further ISIS expansion into the
Syrian central corridor.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">ISIS
dramatically escalated its efforts against the Assad regime in eastern Syria
over the past week, initiating two major offensives targeting several towns and
military positions in Deir ez-Zour and Homs Provinces. These operations demonstrate
that ISIS has not lost its offensive capability in Syria despite a </span><a href="https://zamanalwsl.net/news/60491.html"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">string</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> </span><a href="http://www.syriahr.com/en/2015/05/ypg-seizes-the-strategic-area-of-alya-in-northwest-of-the-town-of-tal-tamer/"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">of</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> </span><a href="http://www.syriahr.com/en/2015/05/more-than-110-members-killed-in-is-attack-on-the-town-of-al-sikhni-and-around-the-city-of-tadmor/"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">significant</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> </span><a href="http://www.syriahr.com/en/2015/05/ypg-takes-over-more-than-20-villages-and-farmlands-in-last-48-hours-in-al-hasakah/"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">losses</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> to Kurdish forces supported by
U.S.-led coalition airstrikes in northeastern Syria. The size and scope of
these offensives indicates that ISIS may have made the strategic decision to direct
a large portion of its combat reserves and materiel resources away from Kurdish
territory in eastern Aleppo and Hasaka Provinces towards central Syria. This
shift is likely motivated by a desire to reassert ISIS’s ‘narrative of victory’
following recent setbacks in northern Syria and in Iraq which have slowed the
group’s operational momentum. The perceived weakness of the Assad regime
following major victories by JN and rebel forces in </span><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/28/us-mideast-crisis-idlib-control-idUSKBN0MO0M020150328"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Idlib City</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> and </span><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/25/us-syria-crisis-town-idUSKBN0NG09220150425"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Jisr al-Shughour</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> presents an inviting target for
ISIS’s expansion. ISIS may also desire to reaffirm its status as a prominent
anti-Assad actor in response to the JN successes in Idlib Province in order to bolster
its recruitment efforts among the Syrian opposition.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">ISIS’s
escalation in eastern Syria began on May 6, 2015, when ISIS </span><a href="http://www.shaam.org/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%85-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%B1.html"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">launched</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> a wide-scale attack targeting the regime-held
sections of eastern Deir ez-Zour city. Clashes </span><a href="http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2015/May-06/297073-isis-launches-offensive-in-deir-al-zor-city-activists.ashx"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">centered</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> around the southeastern neighborhoods
of </span><a href="http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35.318977&lon=40.153012&z=15&show=/20792354/Al-Sina-ah-District"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">al-Sina’a</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">, </span><a href="http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35.315615&lon=40.155244&z=15&m=b&show=/20792519/Mayssalon"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">ar-Rusafa</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">, and </span><a href="http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35.322409&lon=40.155244&z=15&m=b&show=/19357174/Workers-housing-District"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">al-Omal</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">, all located north of the
regime-held Deir ez-Zour Military Airport. ISIS </span><a href="http://www.shaam.org/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D8%A5%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF.html"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">seized</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> the al-Jumayn Checkpoint in the
al-Sina’a District after </span><a href="http://syriadirect.org/news/syria-direct-news-update-5-7-15/"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">conducting</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> a tank-borne SVBIED against the
position. ISIS also made additional advances in the al-Omal and </span><a href="http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35.318767&lon=40.162325&z=14&show=/20792812/Jubailah&search=rusafa"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Jubaylah</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> Districts after detonating at
least two </span><a href="http://www.syriahr.com/en/2015/05/ypg-advances-in-northwest-of-tal-tamer-and-4-regimes-members-killed-in-deir-ezzor-city/"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">tunnel</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> </span><a href="http://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Multimedia/is-video-shows-clashes-and-suicide-bombing-in-outskirts-of-deir-al-zour.html"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">bombs</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> under regime positions. On May 13,
ISIS claimed to </span><a href="http://syriadirect.org/news/syria-direct-news-update-5-13-15/"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">seize</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> Saker Island in the Euphrates
River north of the Deir ez-Zour Military Airport following a week of heavy
clashes. As of publication, ISIS forces have capitalized on their control of
Saker Island to </span><a href="http://syriadirect.org/news/syria-direct-news-update-5-14-15/"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">stage</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> attacks into </span><a href="http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35.312884&lon=40.159664&z=14&m=b&show=/20792177/Harrabesh-District"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Harrabesh</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> District and other areas along the
northern perimeter of the Deir ez-Zour Military Airport.</span></div>
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<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-dj_Qmx-pJ3A/VVUSxV54zgI/AAAAAAAADLk/6s7kN4b4VZg/s1600/General%2BIssam%2BZahreddine.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="336" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-dj_Qmx-pJ3A/VVUSxV54zgI/AAAAAAAADLk/6s7kN4b4VZg/s640/General%2BIssam%2BZahreddine.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">104<sup>th</sup>
Republican Guard Brigade commander Brig. Gen. Issam Zahreddine in Deir ez-Zour, late 2014<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">Photo Distributed by <a href="http://www.almasdarnews.com/article/large-convoy-republican-guard-reinforcements-enter-arrive-deir-ezzor-general-zahreddine-among-men/" target="_blank">Al-Masdar News</a>, September 5, 2014</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">ISIS’s
advance in Deir ez-Zour has likely been enabled in part by the reported </span><a href="http://www.almasdarnews.com/article/isis-storms-deir-ezzor-after-the-republican-guard-was-transferred-to-rif-dimashq/"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">redeployment</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> of regime Brigadier General Issam
Zahreddine and his elite 104<sup>th</sup> Republican Guard Brigade away from
Deir ez-Zour to the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus in early May 2015. The
104<sup>th</sup> Brigade played a key role in stabilizing frontlines between
ISIS and the regime in Deir ez-Zour after its arrival to reinforce the SAA 137<sup>th</sup>
Brigade in Deir ez-Zour in early 2014. The defense of Deir ez-Zour represented
a key component of Assad’s “</span><a href="http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/An%20Army%20in%20All%20Corners%20by%20Chris%20Kozak%201.pdf"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">army in all corners</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">” strategy, which called for
pro-regime forces to maintain far-flung combat outposts such as the Deir
ez-Zour Military Airport in order to pin the bounds of a unified post-war
Syrian state and reinforce Assad’s claim to political legitimacy. The
withdrawal of the 104<sup>th</sup> Brigade signifies a clear deprioritization
of the Deir ez-Zour front by the Assad regime and suggests that recent rebel
advances in western Syria may be forcing the regime to reevaluate the viability
the “army in all corners” strategy.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">ISIS
applied additional pressure to the Assad regime on May 13, 2015, launching a
second offensive targeting regime positions throughout eastern Homs Province. One
element of the ISIS advance targeted </span><a href="http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=34.766999&lon=38.767319&z=11&show=/15686461/As-Sukhnah"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">al-Sukhna</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> northeast of Palmyra, </span><a href="http://www.syriahr.com/en/2015/05/is-advances-in-the-eastern-countryside-of-homs-and-kills-30-soldiers-in-regime-forces/"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">capturing</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> the town after heavy clashes which
</span><a href="http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2015/May-13/297800-isis-attacks-army-held-areas-in-central-syria.ashx"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">killed</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> nearly sixty combatants and left
over one hundred wounded. On the same day, ISIS conducted a two-pronged </span><a href="http://syriadirect.org/news/is-launches-full-on-assault-on-palmyra/"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">offensive</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> targeting the major regime
strongpoint of Palmyra from the north and west, </span><a href="http://www.shaam.org/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A9-8-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A1%D9%8B-%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AB-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-13-05-2015.html"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">seizing</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> the </span><a href="http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=34.586478&lon=38.287525&z=15&show=/32982900/Al-Amiriyah"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">al-Amiriyah</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> District north of the city and
shelling the strategic Palmyra Military Airbase with Grad rockets. ISIS
militants conducted </span><a href="http://www.shaam.org/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%82-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85-%D9%83%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%B5-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%88-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AF.html"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">raids</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> targeting a large complex of
weapon depots located northwest of Palmyra, while pro-ISIS social media
accounts also claimed the seizure of several regime checkpoints surrounding the
</span><a href="http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=34.509669&lon=38.696938&z=12&show=/5288607/T3-Pumping-station"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">T3 Pumping Station</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> east of the city. As of May 14, activists
continued to report </span><a href="http://www.syriahr.com/en/2015/05/more-than-110-members-killed-in-is-attack-on-the-town-of-al-sikhni-and-around-the-city-of-tadmor/"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">heavy</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> </span><a href="http://syriadirect.org/news/palmyra-residents-in-%E2%80%98state-of-fear%E2%80%99-as-is-approaches/"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">clashes</span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> between ISIS and regime forces on
the northern, western, and eastern outskirts of Palmyra.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">ISIS Offensives in
Central Syria, May 6 – May 14, 2015<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">The
ISIS offensives targeting al-Sukhna and Palmyra differ dramatically from the
previous pattern of ISIS attacks witnessed in eastern Homs Province. Previous
ISIS operations in the region had emphasized rapid, mobile raids against
isolated regime positions that were intended to inflict casualties and seize
weapons while avoiding retaliatory airstrikes. In contrast, the recent
offensives reveal that ISIS retains the desire and capability to secure and
hold urban terrain. If ISIS can consolidate its gains, <span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial;">it will be in position to contest the Palmyra Military
Airbase and simultaneously isolate the ground line of communication to the Deir
ez-Zour Military Airport via the Homs-Palmyra-Deir ez-Zour Highway. ISIS’s
advances in both Deir ez-Zour and eastern Homs Province threaten to undermine the
remaining military installations in eastern Syria, eliminating any potential
roadblocks to further encroachment by ISIS into the Syrian central corridor
near Homs and Hama cities. The Assad regime suffers from long-standing </span></span><a href="http://iswsyria.blogspot.com/2014/12/the-assad-regime-under-stress.html"><span style="background: white; font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">manpower</span></a><span style="background: white;"> problems which force the regime to conduct a zero-sum
balancing act across its many standing fronts and its forces have been further strained
by recent opposition advances in both northern and southern Syria.</span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial;"> This
lack of a flexible combat reserve means that Assad will likely have to choose
between devoting res</span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; font-style: normal;">ources to face the emergent ISIS threat in central Syria or
the advancing JN-rebel coalition in western Syria. In either scenario,
Salafi-jihadist factions are set to make further territorial gains in Syria.</span><span style="background: white; font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8692611973981682772.post-84410405748384520372015-05-12T15:32:00.000-07:002015-05-12T15:32:21.940-07:00Syria Situation Report: May 5-12, 2015<div style="text-align: center;">
<i>by: Genevieve Casagrande with Christopher Kozak</i></div>
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<i><br /></i></div>
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Institute for the Study of Warhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02246162429105229906noreply@blogger.com