by: Christopher Kozak, Jennifer Cafarella, and Nicolas Ball
KEY TAKEAWAY
A series of ISIS defeats in Iraq and northern Syria over the past three months have driven ISIS to shift the focus of its Syrian campaign into central and western Syria in order to reestablish an image of military strength. ISIS was required to seek an alternate focus for its war effort in Syria due to its inability to defeat YPG forces in Aleppo and Hasaka Provinces. ISIS appears to have decided to target the Syrian regime rather than escalate directly against JN or Syrian rebel groups, and will likely continue capitalizing on disruptions in the regime’s military campaign in Idlib and Dera’a in order to maximize the effect of its own attacks in central Syria. ISIS may conduct a major attack against critical regime terrain such as the Palmyra Military Airbase or the regime and Hezbollah stronghold of Qusayr near the Lebanese border. If ISIS forces begin to display the ability to hold overrun regime positions in eastern Homs and Hama Provinces, this would be an indicator of a near-term ISIS offensive in the Syrian central corridor.
ISIS must balance its expanding activities in central and western Syria with the requirements of its ongoing defensive operations in northern and eastern Syria. ISIS escalation in central Syria may invite opportunistic or retributive counterattacks against ISIS forces in northern and eastern Syria by either YPG or Syrian regime forces. ISIS must maintain stable defensive lines in order to protect core ISIS interests in both Syria and Iraq. These include cross-border smuggling routes into Turkey, ground lines of communication connecting ISIS in Syria to ISIS in northern and western Iraq, and ultimately the de facto ISIS capital city of ar-Raqqa. ISIS appears to calculate that it is possible to maintain this defense by leveraging rebel defections to ISIS to offset the resource requirements of expansion into the central corridor. ISIS therefore prioritizes changing the calculus of rebel groups to favor ISIS expansion, and does so by disrupting the existing security environment. ISIS will likely also leverage its operations against the regime to curry favor with rebel groups, who may opt to facilitate increased ISIS activity in western Syria if directed against the Syrian regime. This expansion into western Syria will present a challenge to the anti-ISIS coalition, as it will likely to be unwilling to or unable to target ISIS positions inside core Syrian terrain.
1: ISIS
Consolidates Defensive Posture Near Ayn al-Arab
ISIS consolidated its defensive lines in eastern Aleppo
Province following its retreat from Ayn al-Arab/Kobani in January 2015, as
joint YPG-rebel forces operating under the Euphrates Volcano Operations Room
and supported by U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition airstrikes pushed southwest to
challenge ISIS terrain along the Euphrates River. ISIS destroyed the Shuyukh Fawqani
and Qarah Qawqaz
bridges in mid-March after withdrawing to the western bank of the
Euphrates River, ceding control of several villages to YPG-led forces in order to leverage the Euphrates as a
natural barrier to YPG expansion. The slowdown of the Kurdish advance outwards
from Ayn al-Arab/Kobani likely reflects Kurdish inability to project force
deeper into the southern Ayn al-Arab countryside in order to challenge
ISIS-held terrain along the M4 highway. It is also likely that the YPG do not seek
to attack deep into the ISIS-held interior, where there is a minimal Kurdish population.
ISIS is therefore likely to maintain its now-fortified positions on the western
bank of the Euphrates River, and is unlikely to be challenged in its
southeastern Aleppo or Raqqa terrain in the near term.
2: ISIS Maintains
Pressure on YPG Forces in Western Hasaka Province
ISIS has applied consistent offensive pressure against
key YPG terrain along a frontline stretching from Ras al-Ayn on the Turkish
border southeast through Tel Tamir and the Assyrian Christian villages of the
Khabour Valley to Hasaka city. Taking advantage of the limited coalition air
support provided to YPG forces in the province, ISIS launched an offensive against Ras al-Ayn on March 10, seizing Tel Khanzir and several other villages west and south of the town in clashes which
included two separate Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) attacks. Meanwhile,
ISIS militants continue to combat joint YPG-Assyrian forces in the western countryside of Tel Tamir
following a late February ISIS offensive which seized most of the western bank
of the Khabour River. Since March 20, ISIS also conducted three Suicide
VBIED (SVBIED) and VBIED attacks against Kurdish neighborhoods of Hasaka city in an
apparent attempt to weaken the resolve of Kurdish populations to continue their
campaign against ISIS. Although ISIS has not managed to make major gains in
these offensives, the constant pressure applied to western Hasaka Province is
likely sufficient to prevent further YPG advances that could challenge
ISIS-held terrain along the Turkish border west of Ras al-Ayn.
3: ISIS Enhances
Security Measures in Eastern Deir ez-Zour
ISIS has intensified internal security measures in eastern Deir
ez-Zour Province in response to frequent attacks by unidentified militants against ISIS
security patrols and checkpoints in the town of al-Mayadin in addition to persistent
rumors of the establishment of anti-ISIS
rebel sleeper cells in the region. ISIS continued its ongoing mass arrest campaign targeting former members of Jabhat al-Nusra and other rebel
brigades. This campaign likely allows ISIS to address internal security fears
through intimidation, to neutralize cells of potential resistance, and possibly
to replenish depleted ISIS manpower reserves through conscription. Meanwhile, reports
from March 27-28 indicated that ISIS fighters are reinforcing systems of interlocking trenches and berms
around important ISIS urban terrain, suggesting that ISIS also fears an external
challenge to its control over the Euphrates River Valley. ISIS first implemented this type of
reinforcement in early January, digging a trench southwest of Abu Kamal, and
has since expanded this fortification to almost fully encircle the border town
in addition to constructing similar defenses surrounding al-Mayadin. ISIS likely
perceives a continued threat from Deir ez-Zour tribes based in the eastern
countryside of the province, who have previously resisted ISIS consolidation of
power over the area. These fears may have been stoked in part by a regime raid against the ISIS-held T2 oil field west of Abu Kamal on March 4,
which marked the first hostile incursion into eastern Deir ez-Zour Province
since ISIS seized the area last year.
4: ISIS Assaults
the Syrian Regime in Central Syria
ISIS appears to have designated a new main effort against the
Assad regime in central Syria beginning in early March 2015. Over the past
month, ISIS forces launched a series of successful hit-and-run attacks against
regime checkpoints, military facilities, and oil
installations throughout eastern Homs and
Hama Provinces including recent assaults against an air defense battalion near the Tiyas (T4) Airbase east
of Homs City on March 27 and the regime-held village of Mabouja east of Hama City on March 31.
The nature of these offensives suggests that ISIS seeks to shape the conditions
for future territorial gains in central and western Syria while bolstering ISIS
morale with a new narrative of victory. ISIS has conducted executions of alleged
regime collaborators, massacres of Alawite civilians, and publicized beheadings of regime fighters in an effort to
establish a perception of dominance over the Syrian regime and likely to
maximize the asymmetric effect of ISIS attacks through psychological warfare. Increasing the visibility of
this campaign, ISIS reestablished its “Wilayat” [Province] in Hama Province on March
29, releasing a video branded with the Wilayat Hama
logo after over a year of silence. The
reestablishment of the ISIS Hama media office underscores the propaganda value that
ISIS seeks to derive from its operations against the regime in this region, and
may signal ISIS intent to formalize its governance activities in the area. However,
ISIS forces in Homs and Hama Provinces do not appear able to conduct sustained operations
or hold recently-seized terrain. Multiple reports of ISIS withdrawals following heavy regime aerial bombardment suggest that ISIS
units in central Syria may not currently possess sufficient resources to
decisively overcome the Assad regime’s military advantages. Nonetheless, by
threatening key regime terrain such as the Palmyra Military Airbase, the supply routes to Aleppo and Deir ez-Zour cities, and the natural gas infrastructure which provides much of
Syria’s electricity, ISIS may achieve asymmetric effects against the regime.
This could include forcing the regime to redeploy additional reinforcements to
the region, creating opportunities for ISIS expansion into the Syrian central
corridor.
5: ISIS Builds
Presence in the Damascus Countryside
ISIS cells in western Syria continue to infiltrate and
subvert opposition-held terrain. ISIS persists in its effort to expand into
rebel-held areas of Qalamoun and the southern and eastern
countryside of Damascus, increasingly challenging
rebel control of terrain and the unity of rebel ranks. This is likely in order
to secure lines of communication that connect ISIS forces in the eastern Homs
countryside to ISIS forces positioned along the Lebanese border and inside
Damascus city. ISIS militants operating out of the Hajar al-Aswad neighborhood
of southern Damascus are accused of conducting an escalating campaign of kidnappings and attempted assassinations of prominent opposition figures in the southern and eastern
suburbs of the city in early March. This campaign is targeted to generate local
disorder and rebel disunity that can create exploitable opportunities for ISIS
expansion. ISIS has also worked to strengthen its direct governance in southern
Damascus through public executions, including the March 20 beheadings of three men accused of colluding with the regime. However,
ISIS expansion into Damascus Province is met with active hostility from JN, Jaysh al-Islam, and other opposition factions which
will be difficult to overcome without additional investment of resources or
manpower by ISIS in the near term.
6: ISIS Tests Rebel Unity in Aleppo
A stagnated front line persists between ISIS and rebel forces
supported by JN north of Aleppo city. ISIS appears engaged in an effort to
disrupt security in rebel and Kurdish-held areas of western Aleppo in order to
create an opportunity for ISIS to advance. The objective of the stalled ISIS
military offensive north of Aleppo city appears to be to seize control of the
rebel supply line passing from the Bab al-Salama border crossing into the
former ISIS stronghold of Azaz. Throughout March, ISIS demonstrated the ability
to penetrate into Kurdish and rebel-held terrain through sleeper cell activity.
Both the YPG and Ahrar al-Sham claimed to have arrested ISIS sleeper cells. An SVEST attack on March 25 targeting a rebel
checkpoint west of Aleppo city appeared to further validate fears of ISIS
infiltration into rebel terrain. ISIS complements these efforts through a
propaganda campaign that attempts to justify ISIS aggression toward certain
rebel groups under the guise of combating Western influence and secularism. ISIS
has also increased its defensive fortifications north of Aleppo city, possibly
in response to a recent increase in JN and rebel tactical victories against the
regime in the area. ISIS forces are reportedly digging a network of trenches near
Dabiq, building concrete rooms to protect ISIS forces from anti-ISIS coalition
airstrikes, and ordering the evacuation of civilians, likely to
enable increased fortification in the area. ISIS is likely to continue these
two lines of effort in Aleppo in the near term rather than launching a direct
offensive against JN and rebel forces.