By: Christopher Kozak
Key
Takeaway: ISIS has neither been defeated nor
relegated entirely to the defensive in Syria despite a string of losses to
Kurdish forces assisted by U.S.-led coalition airstrikes. Instead, ISIS has launched
two major offensives targeting Syrian military positions in central and eastern
Syria since May 6, 2015, likely taking advantage of the Assad regime’s
preoccupation with recent JN and rebel advances in Idlib Province. A
consolidation of these gains would leave ISIS in position to contest and
potentially seize the most important remaining military installations in eastern
Syria, eliminating any potential roadblocks to further ISIS expansion into the
Syrian central corridor.
ISIS
dramatically escalated its efforts against the Assad regime in eastern Syria
over the past week, initiating two major offensives targeting several towns and
military positions in Deir ez-Zour and Homs Provinces. These operations demonstrate
that ISIS has not lost its offensive capability in Syria despite a string of significant losses to Kurdish forces supported by
U.S.-led coalition airstrikes in northeastern Syria. The size and scope of
these offensives indicates that ISIS may have made the strategic decision to direct
a large portion of its combat reserves and materiel resources away from Kurdish
territory in eastern Aleppo and Hasaka Provinces towards central Syria. This
shift is likely motivated by a desire to reassert ISIS’s ‘narrative of victory’
following recent setbacks in northern Syria and in Iraq which have slowed the
group’s operational momentum. The perceived weakness of the Assad regime
following major victories by JN and rebel forces in Idlib City and Jisr al-Shughour presents an inviting target for
ISIS’s expansion. ISIS may also desire to reaffirm its status as a prominent
anti-Assad actor in response to the JN successes in Idlib Province in order to bolster
its recruitment efforts among the Syrian opposition.
ISIS’s
escalation in eastern Syria began on May 6, 2015, when ISIS launched a wide-scale attack targeting the regime-held
sections of eastern Deir ez-Zour city. Clashes centered around the southeastern neighborhoods
of al-Sina’a, ar-Rusafa, and al-Omal, all located north of the
regime-held Deir ez-Zour Military Airport. ISIS seized the al-Jumayn Checkpoint in the
al-Sina’a District after conducting a tank-borne SVBIED against the
position. ISIS also made additional advances in the al-Omal and Jubaylah Districts after detonating at
least two tunnel bombs under regime positions. On May 13,
ISIS claimed to seize Saker Island in the Euphrates
River north of the Deir ez-Zour Military Airport following a week of heavy
clashes. As of publication, ISIS forces have capitalized on their control of
Saker Island to stage attacks into Harrabesh District and other areas along the
northern perimeter of the Deir ez-Zour Military Airport.
104th
Republican Guard Brigade commander Brig. Gen. Issam Zahreddine in Deir ez-Zour, late 2014
Photo Distributed by Al-Masdar News, September 5, 2014
ISIS’s
advance in Deir ez-Zour has likely been enabled in part by the reported redeployment of regime Brigadier General Issam
Zahreddine and his elite 104th Republican Guard Brigade away from
Deir ez-Zour to the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus in early May 2015. The
104th Brigade played a key role in stabilizing frontlines between
ISIS and the regime in Deir ez-Zour after its arrival to reinforce the SAA 137th
Brigade in Deir ez-Zour in early 2014. The defense of Deir ez-Zour represented
a key component of Assad’s “army in all corners” strategy, which called for
pro-regime forces to maintain far-flung combat outposts such as the Deir
ez-Zour Military Airport in order to pin the bounds of a unified post-war
Syrian state and reinforce Assad’s claim to political legitimacy. The
withdrawal of the 104th Brigade signifies a clear deprioritization
of the Deir ez-Zour front by the Assad regime and suggests that recent rebel
advances in western Syria may be forcing the regime to reevaluate the viability
the “army in all corners” strategy.
ISIS
applied additional pressure to the Assad regime on May 13, 2015, launching a
second offensive targeting regime positions throughout eastern Homs Province. One
element of the ISIS advance targeted al-Sukhna northeast of Palmyra, capturing the town after heavy clashes which
killed nearly sixty combatants and left
over one hundred wounded. On the same day, ISIS conducted a two-pronged offensive targeting the major regime
strongpoint of Palmyra from the north and west, seizing the al-Amiriyah District north of the city and
shelling the strategic Palmyra Military Airbase with Grad rockets. ISIS
militants conducted raids targeting a large complex of
weapon depots located northwest of Palmyra, while pro-ISIS social media
accounts also claimed the seizure of several regime checkpoints surrounding the
T3 Pumping Station east of the city. As of May 14, activists
continued to report heavy clashes between ISIS and regime forces on
the northern, western, and eastern outskirts of Palmyra.
ISIS Offensives in
Central Syria, May 6 – May 14, 2015
The
ISIS offensives targeting al-Sukhna and Palmyra differ dramatically from the
previous pattern of ISIS attacks witnessed in eastern Homs Province. Previous
ISIS operations in the region had emphasized rapid, mobile raids against
isolated regime positions that were intended to inflict casualties and seize
weapons while avoiding retaliatory airstrikes. In contrast, the recent
offensives reveal that ISIS retains the desire and capability to secure and
hold urban terrain. If ISIS can consolidate its gains, it will be in position to contest the Palmyra Military
Airbase and simultaneously isolate the ground line of communication to the Deir
ez-Zour Military Airport via the Homs-Palmyra-Deir ez-Zour Highway. ISIS’s
advances in both Deir ez-Zour and eastern Homs Province threaten to undermine the
remaining military installations in eastern Syria, eliminating any potential
roadblocks to further encroachment by ISIS into the Syrian central corridor
near Homs and Hama cities. The Assad regime suffers from long-standing manpower problems which force the regime to conduct a zero-sum
balancing act across its many standing fronts and its forces have been further strained
by recent opposition advances in both northern and southern Syria. This
lack of a flexible combat reserve means that Assad will likely have to choose
between devoting resources to face the emergent ISIS threat in central Syria or
the advancing JN-rebel coalition in western Syria. In either scenario,
Salafi-jihadist factions are set to make further territorial gains in Syria.