by: Jennifer Cafarella
Key Takeaway: Major operations targeting entrenched anti-Assad forces in the outskirts of Damascus appear to be upcoming as Hezbollah and the Syrian regime prepare to target anti-Assad hold out positions in the capital and its countryside. In addition, indicators have emerged of a possible intervention by regional actors to assist in defeating Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. This includes ongoing negotiations to deepen the cooperation between prominent hardline Islamist groups Jaysh al-Islam and Harakat Ahrar al-Sham, which would increase the effectiveness of anti-Assad forces regardless of direct regional intervention. Together these trends indicate that a major shakeup of the military situation in Damascus Province is likely in coming weeks.
The Syrian regime launched an attack on May 3 targeting the town
of Maydaa, which buffers a crucial remaining rebel supply line into the partly
besieged Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus. The regime made immediate gains,
but clashes are reportedly ongoing in
the area. According to Damascus-based Jaysh al-Islam
commander Zahran Alloush, “if the army succeeds in taking Maydaa they could use
it as a launchpad to storm Eastern Ghouta.” It therefore appears that the Assad
regime may be setting conditions for a major campaign inside of the capital. Following
the attack, conflicting reports indicate that either multiple IEDs or a suicide bomber detonated inside the Rukn al-Din
neighborhood of Damascus on May 4, injuring a regime major general. The Rukn
al-Din neighborhood is home to a number of senior regime officials and elements of Syria’s intelligence
apparatus. Jabhat al-Nsura (JN) later claimed via twitter that three JN fighters successfully penetrated a military logistics and supply
building on Barniya Street near the neighborhood, likely in the same attack
that killed the regime general. This attack could be an attempt by JN disrupt the
regime’s operation in Eastern Ghouta.
The attack also indicates JN’s ability to penetrate core regime-held
neighborhoods with spectacular attacks. If anti-Assad strongholds in the
eastern outskirts of the capital begin to fall, JN could attempt to force a
constriction in the regime’s deployment in the capital through spectacular
attacks targeting core regime-held terrain. Seeming to indicate this threat, unconfirmed
reports emerged from a Saudi newspaper that the regime's intelligence service
asked all of the “top families” of Damascus to relocate to Latakia
city within
48 hours on May 3, 2015. According to the report, the regime has specifically
asked the families of the Mezzeh district to abandon the city. The Mezzeh
Military Airbase is one of Assad’s primary airports to support its operations in Damascus, and is located less than five
miles from the Presidential Palace, making the Mezzeh district some of the
regime’s most fortified terrain.
The possibility of a regional intervention by Saudi Arabia and
Turkey to support Damascus-based rebels may encourage the regime to secure
immediate gains in the capital that could neutralize opportunities for regional
actors. Indications of a possible Saudi and Turkish intervention in Syria against
Assad have increased in recent weeks. Following the fall of Idlib City and Jisr
al-Shughour in Idlib Province to JN and rebel forces, reports
emerged of increased
amounts of regional aid being
delivered to rebels in northern Syria. In addition, major rebel groups in
southern Syria claimed in late April to have engaged in discussions with
regional actors regarding the provision of “Arab
air cover” or other anti-aircraft
capabilities to Syrian opposition fighters for an upcoming operation against
the regime, likely in southern Damascus and Dera’a Provinces. Zahran Alloush, the
leader of the Saudi-backed Jaysh al-Islam, is currently in Turkey after arriving on April 17 for a series of undisclosed meetings. According to
photos circulated by pro-opposition sources, Alloush recently met with leaders from hardline Islamist group Harakat
Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya (HASI). The discussions underway in Turkey reportedly constitute an attempt by these
two groups to negotiate a new cooperative relationship, likely under Saudi and
Turkish supervision. A member of the Islamic Front Shura Council denied that the groups were considering a full merger but indicated that
deepening cooperation between the groups is upcoming.
From left to right: HASI leader Hassem Sheikh, Jaysh
al-Islam leader Zahran Alloush, and Suqour al-Sham
(HASI’s armed wing) leader Sheikh Ahmed Issa
Meanwhile, unconfirmed Lebanese sources are also indicating that Hezbollah’s expected
offensive targeting the Qalamoun border region with Syria is imminent and “could start in hours.” According to “field
sources” cited by the Lebanese paper Janoubiya
on May 3, a large number of Shi’a youth have traveled from villages in the western
Bekaa Valley to the Northern Bekaa region to prepare for the “Battle of Spring”
in Qalamoun, which is expected to begin in the next 48 hours. Jihadists in the
border region also appear to be gearing up for upcoming operations, likely
indicating that a battle in the border region will require a significant
military effort from Hezbollah. JN released a series of photos from the Qalamoun region
showing its fighters training on a variety of anti-tank weapons systems. The
tweets follow a set of earlier pictures from a graduation ceremony from
a JN training camp. One of these tweets stated that “[the mujahideen] are
almost ready to free their villages,” likely indicating upcoming JN offensive
operations in the border region. JN and rebel fighters in the Qalamoun region
launched a surprise assault against Hezbollah and Syrian
regime positions in the Zabadani area and the Tfeil enclave on May 4, possibly
indicating the start of a JN-led campaign in the border region.
A JN trainer instructs JN
fighters using anti-tank weapon
It is unclear if the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will be able to
maintain security in Lebanon’s bordering Bekaa valley if a major Qalamoun
offensive occurs. Lebanese Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri indicated that he supports the
upcoming Hezbollah offensive and that the LAF will continue to respond to
jihadist activity on the Lebanese side of the border in case of escalation.
With Hezbollah’s backing, the LAF and Lebanese General Security have made a
string of important arrests that appear to be dismantling the jihadist network inside
Lebanon. However, jihadist actors in the Qalamoun, including both JN and ISIS,
have dormant strength in the Bekaa Valley and will likely leverage this to escalate
on both sides of the Lebanese-Syrian border.
Assad is likely to calculate his activities in Damascus in the
context of the security of key regime supply lines transiting the Damascus
countryside from Lebanon. Escalation in both the capital and its countryside could
result in dangerous destabilization that could jeopardize the continued
security of key regime terrain in the capital, such as that represented by the
Mezzeh district. Yet a combined regime and Hezbollah assault against anti-Assad
hold out positions in both Damascus and the Qalamoun region could also achieve
a major victory and reestablish the military superiority of pro-regime forces
in Syria. Regional actors are likely to engage with this dynamic and calculate
the possibilities and prospects of intervention according to the realities of
the military situation in the province. Jaysh al-Islam and HASI will be key
players in rebel activities in Damascus province regardless of whether
intervention materializes.